History and Theory of Psychology Course

Paul F. Ballantyne, Ph.D.
pballan@comnet.ca

Langfeld, H.S. (1945). Introduction [to the Symposium on Operationism]. Psyc. Rev., 32, 241-243.

About a year ago Professor E.G. Boring wrote to suggest a symposium on operationism and appended a few questions which he said he would like to have answered. The Editor welcomed the idea and invited a number of persons interested in operationism to take part in the symposium. They were sent Professor Boring's questions and asked to add questions of their own to the list. Professors E.G. Boring, P.W. Bridgman, Herbert Feigl, Harold Israel, Carroll C. Pratt and B.F. Skinner accepted the invitation and submitted additional questions. The complete list was then sent to each participant with instructions to write on any or all of the questions. When the galley proof was ready, all of it was sent to each person with the request that he write a short rebuttal. All but one participant consented. These replies, which are more than rebuttals, follow the main articles under the title 'Rejoinders and Second Thoughts.'

These are the questions. They are referred to in the text by their numbers.

1. (a) what is the purpose of operational definitions? When are they called for?

Since it is obviously impossible to explicate an operational definition for every construct-term used in scientific discussion, there must be some principle which determines when operational definitions are useful.

(b) Logically, operational definitions could form an infinite regress, since the construct-terms used in describing an operation are themselves in need of definition.

How is this regress limited in scientific practice?

2. When the same construct is defined by two independent operations, should it be said that there are really two constructs? For instance, it has been said that tape-measured distance and triangulated distance are really two kinds of distance and should perhaps have different names.

Against this view it can be argued that these are operations for showing the equivalence of operations, e.g., for demonstrating the identity of taped and surveyed short distances.

3. (a) Are hypothetical operations which are physically impossible with present available techniques, of scientific use? Is the other side of the moon what you would see if you went there?

It is arguable that an unperformable operation has value in stating the conditions by which a construct could be validated. Such a statement shows that the construct is not at the moment valid.

(b) Is there a use for hypothetical operations that would define constructs which are actually at the moment nonexistent?

Red and green are supposed to be derived from yellow in the course of evolution. The discriminatory operations which would establish the existence of two new colors, derived similarly from blue, could be stated, although they could not be performed at the present stage of evolutionary development. The operations which would define a new invisible planet are similar.

(c) Is there a use for hypothetical operations which could never be performed?

The definition of infinity depends on operations which can never be completed.

4. Is experience a proper construct for operational definition?

It has been held that experience is ultimate, subject to immediate intuition but not to operational definition.

5. Are there scientifically good and bad operations, and how are operations evaluated if they differ in value?

Objectivists hold that the data of experience can always be operationally defined if the data become public, because the operations of publication define the datum. It is, however, argued further that the operations of verbal report are 'poorer' than the operation of discriminatory choice (C.R.; jumping stand) because the verbal response itself involves terms that are less rigorously defined.

6. Is operationism more than a renewed and refined emphasis upon the experimental method (as understood already by Galileo, if not even by Archimedes) --i.e., a formulation of modern scientific empiricism and pragmatism (especially of the Peirce-Dewey variety), mainly of criteria of factual meaningfulness and empirical validity?

7. Must operationists in psychology relegate theorizing of all sorts to the limbo of metaphysics? Bridgman in physics is perfectly aware of the value of theories as long as they are in keeping with his operational requirements. The Gestaltists, particularly Kohler and Koffka, have repeatedly attacked positivism (an identical twin of operationism), reproaching it for its (alleged) opposition to theoretical construction. C.C. Pratt (Logic of Modern Psychology, pp. 147-154) on the basis of his operationism maintains that all theoretical explanation is circular or tautological. Kohler (Dynamics in Psychology, pp. 107-125) holds a strictly opposite view. Which position is the most adequate for psychological research?

8. Some radical operationists assert that the meaning of a quantitative concept lies exclusively in the set of measuring operations which determine the application of the concept. (E.g.: "Intelligence is what the intelligence test tests.") But how can we then know what it is that we are after in constructing tests; and what possible meaning is there in talking about improving or revising tests and measurements if there are no criteria outside the chosen test methods?

9. Are all scientifically legitimate definitions operational in character? This is (at least in part) a terminological question, but certainly one that it would pay to settle (not only) among psychologists.

10. What is a definition, operational or otherwise? It is important to know whether one is presupposing a logical apparatus for dealing with the language of science or intending through a psychological analysis to justify such an apparatus.

11. For the purpose of operational definition, what class or classes of events may be used properly as defining-operations? Specifically, can a phenomenon be identified or its properties be defined in terms of the events (operations) which are effective to produce, or occur as results of, the phenomenon?

The Editor