Unity and Diversity of Subject Matter or Pluralism?
(A lesson from Woodworth's middle of the Road Psychology).

Paul F. Ballantyne

*A paper presented at Cheiron. New Hampshire, USA, June 26, 1993.

Abstract

This paper treats the question of the unity of psychological subject matter in a manner consistent with R.S. Woodworth's (1931; 1943) views regarding the complexity of psychological subject matter as the origin of different schools in psychology. In this context Hilgard's Psychology in America (1987) is chastised for not distinguishing "plurality of subject matter" from "pluralism."

A brief rebuttal of views from the pluralism camp (e.g., M. Gergen, 1987; Wertheimer, 1988; Stam, 1992) is provided to clarify this distinction. The concept of pluralistic monism (Tolman, 1989) is mentioned as an alternative for moderates from both sides of the unity-disunity debate (e.g., Viney, 1989; Danziger, 1990).

Lastly, Woodworth's (1931) comments on the important disciplinary role of the "middle of the road" are mentioned as they relate to current acrimonious debates over the unity of psychological subject matter or unification of theories question.

Introduction

Discussions on unity and disunity tend to focus on three aspects of the problem: Unity of the Sciences, Unity of a Science (e.g., psychology), and Unification of empirical and theoretical positions. I have discussed all three elsewhere (see Ballantyne 1992, 1993) but the present talk is about this middle question "the unity of psychological subject matter."

In reply to my own unificationist leanings some colleagues have referred to the considerable diversity between the sections of professional organizations such as APA and CPA. The APA was established in 1892 and their first meeting which held parallel sessions was in 1897. In 1945 it had 18 divisions and 21 more were added by 1980. There are presently 49 APA divisions. A similar story could be told about CPA. This is indeed evidence of increasing professional diversity of interest.

Does the recognition of this much diversity indicate that an unavoidable problematic logical contradiction exists in the unificationist position? I suggest the answer to this question is no.

By utilizing the views of R.S. Woodworth and others it can be argued that: (1) the unificationist position reflects an nonproblematic objective contradiction of the psychological subject matter itself; and (2) that it is the "pluralism" position which contains a fatal logical contradiction.

A Definition

The question of the unity of psychological subject matter is not only an issue of (1) how the various areas of specialization and methods of psychology are complementary, but is also an issue of (2) which theoretical concepts best capture the complexity of that subject matter.

This is the working definition of the unity question which middle of the road experimental psychology has been implicitly working on for some time. In the concluding chapter of his Contemporary Schools of Psychology (1931), R.S. Woodworth referred to both the complexity of the subject matter itself and to the successive struggles establishing correct ways to conceptualize that subject matter. He wrote:

"[E]very one must admit that the activity of the human individual is extremely complex. The schools may take their origin from just this complexity…. All the schools are emphasizing something that demands emphasis, and serve a useful function in the progress of psychology. We evidently should define our science broadly enough to cover the positive findings… of all the schools" (Woodworth, 1931, p. 229).

Plurality of Subject Matter

As for the first issue (regarding the complex multiplicity of areas and methods used in psychology), it is generally understood today that the "de facto" areas of specialization in general psychology (perception, memory, learning, motivation, personality), all relate in some manner to one unified ontological level of existence which we call "psychological" rather than biological or sociological processes. J.D. Matarazzo for instance in an article called "There is One Psychology, No specialties," while slightly overstating the case, did point out that the chapter headings for "the best" introductory psychology textbooks have remained relatively stable from 1890 to present (Matarazzo, 1987, p. 898).

Yet the fact that these areas of specialization focus on very different aspects of that psychological level is often suggested to be somehow problematic. Along these lines VandenBos argues that "organized psychology" is "not a monolithic whole" and that no single organization can represent all the interests and concerns of psychology (VandenBos, 1989, p. 984). To which I simply reply: So what?

The complicating feature of inter-area diversity of specialization (animal vs. human memory, learning in preschool kids vs. learning in the aged, etc.) must be recognized to be sure but in what way can it be claimed to be problematic?

Such complexity means merely that any proper understanding of the unity of psychology's subject matter must also recognize its inherent inter-area diversity. The above reference to unity and diversity is less of a logical contradiction in the unificationist argument than a reflection of an objective contradiction (i.e., the internal and developmental contradictions) in the subject matter itself.

Logical and objective contradiction

This difference between logical contradiction (within or between discursive positions) and objective contradiction (in being) is important to keep in mind because recent reviews of the unity question have overlooked it altogether. Michael Wertheimer (1988) for example, implies that the Jamesian view of ontological plurality, "a world imperfectly unified" (James, 1909, p. 108), is the same as the epistemological pluralism put forward by Kuhn, Koch, and Gergen. But in the similarity lies a whole world of difference!

Underlying the pluralism position is the following formula: If plurality, then lack of unity, and therefore pluralism. But William James was very much against such a non sequitur formula. In particular he was against any simplified either monism or pluralism argument. Referring to his own form of pragmatism James wrote:

"With her criterion of the practical differences that theories make, we see that she must equally abjure absolute monism and absolute pluralism (James, A Pluralistic Universe, 1909, p. 105).

Such non-exclusionary thinking was also part of the (1890, 1892) Jamesian view on conscious and self. Consciousness is a series of "flights and perches." Self is the thinker in his various relations: "material, social, and spiritual."

Robert Woodworth certainly recognized this aspect of Jamsian thought. For instance, in his 1943 article looking back on the first 50 years of the APA, Woodworth singled out James's first presidential address "The knowing of things together" (1895) as being concerned with "how there can be unity in plurality, or better, plurality in unity" between the diverse presentations at the APA conferences (Woodworth, 1943, p. 19).

Despite the break away of the philosophers from the APA in 1901 and the ever-expanding politics and complexity of interrelationships between discursive groups and subdisciplines, it might still be said that there is one psychology and many specialties.

It was Woodworth's belief in the oneness and manyness of psychological subject matter that made him suggest in 1943 that if the APA ever did split up it would be along the lines of subject matter (i.e., divergence of subdisciplinary interests) and not on methodological issues of the schools! Approximately 17 years later the Psychonomic Society broke away from the APA at least partially proving Woodworth to be correct. The recognition of the ontological plurality of psychology's subject matter then, does not necessitate an adherence to a full-blown pluralism.

Lest this distinction between plurality and pluralism be labeled an historical triviality in our enlightened times, let me point out one much-read history text where it has been overlooked. On the very last page of Hilgard's Psychology in America (1987) there is a small section called "Pluralism May Be the Answer". In that section Hilgard argues against the feasibility of integrating what Woodworth called the positive (progressive) aspect of different psychological accounts.

"The idea of a unified psychology… may be more an esthetic ideal suggesting… a common front in facing the other sciences than a practical goal for psychological science" (Hilgard, 1987, p. 803).

Unlike Woodworth, yet very much like some of my colleagues at York University, Hilgard does not mention the level of psychological processes in his argumentation. There is a pulling away from such ontological statements about subject matter in favor of more discursive analysis. His discussion centers around the view of psychology as a disciplinary structure of universities, traditions, loyalties, and commitments. He concludes that the "free-market interplay" of theories may prove to be the "inevitable" path taken (Hilgard, 1987, p. 803).

I doubt whether anyone here would argue that Hilgard does not qualify as a middle of the road psychologist (loosely defined). There is much irony then in the fact that when we look at the other figures who have explicitly taken the pluralism stand (e.g., Koch, Gergen, Stam) we find they have strayed very far indeed from the middle of the road and are in danger of sliding off the slippery slope of solipsism. Their understanding of the free-market interplay of ideas is that it is "inimical" to integration (Gergen, 1981, p. 335).

Pluralism with its anti-objectivist concomitant is not only an extremist view but is also logically self-refuting on epistemological grounds. As Foster (1987) pointed out this is the sort of logical contradiction that any responsible psychologist wishes to avoid:

"Thus the 'supreme [logical] contradiction' in the relativist writings where one can almost hear the critical author saying, "No, no. The objectivist does not have a true understanding of the way things really are in (science, psychology, etc.) but I do and I will explain the true picture in my critique" (Foster, 1987, p. 108).

In contrast to the pluralism position (which is logically self-contradictory), the most general suggestions of the other extreme -regarding the recognition of the unity of psychological subject matter- (as put forward by Arthur Staats, 1986) may be accepted without necessarily adhering to the particulars of his so-called "Uninomic Positivist" philosophy.

I formulate those general suggestions as follows:

First, that the abandonment of objectivity (and the embracing of subjective metatheory) is not the only available alternative to the admittedly problematic traditional positivist metatheory of science. Second, that there are features which are general to all sciences (as systematic forms of discourse) but at the same time there are also features that are idiosyncratic to each particular science (these being determined by the particular subject matter of that science). Third, that the interrelation of empirical and theoretical positions should be made a goal because the various areas of the subject matter itself stand in some objective relationship to each other.

Now, why is all of this important enough to mention in a talk at Cheiron? One reason is that our own Dr. Danziger, in his effort to work out a golden mean approach between traditional positivism and anti-objectivism, has confounded this distinction between discourse and being.

Danziger suggests that psychological historians can not make claims about the ontological status of psychological entities but can only analyze the methodological discourse of given individuals or movements (Danziger, 1991, p. 191-93). He suggests this because not only do the conceptions about the subject matter change but also the subject matter itself changes historically and cross-culturally.

"Those volumes of historical readings that present brief extracts from various groups by topics.... [imply] that while various authors have had different opinions... each topic... corresponds to some fixed objective entity... What this... historical material overlooks is... [that] the vary objects of psychological discourse, and not just opinions about them, have changed... in the course of history" (p. 336).

That is, in his rejection of naive ahistorical "naturalism," Danziger sides with the historical assessment of the knowledge products produced by various "generative metaphors" of past research (p. 335). That noncommittal epistemological stand, however, has allowed advocators of pluralism such as Hank Stam (1992) to suggest that Danziger is better off to openly embrace theoretical constructivism. Note that Stam's review article is called "Deconstructing the Subject" in contradistinction to Danziger's "Constructing the Subject."

Full-blown theoretical relativism (a form of epistemological pluralism) is an approach which a diverse set of theorists such as A. Staats, Edward Reed, D.N. Robinson, and Danziger himself have already rejected on a variety of grounds.

Their varying approaches to the problem are similar on one point, they all recognize that the task of assuring that recognizing a unity of psychological subject matter (or at least historical commonalities in research practice) do not slip into a monolithic totality (a unity without diversity) appears much more feasible than the task of assuring that a pluralism or some golden mean position does not slip into solipsism.

An Alternative

One way to consistently avoid both past positivist naturalism and metaphysical pluralism is to adopt the Pluralistic Monism position of C.W. Tolman (1989). Tolman's article which was subtitled "William James as Closet-Heraclitean" argues that at least part of the solution to the present ontological concerns of the pluralism camp has been with us implicitly for some time. Tolman's explicit combination of a dialectical materialist ontology with the direct perception epistemology of J.J. Gibson (1966, 1979) is one with which moderates on both sides of the unity debate may identify. An example of such a moderate approach is Viney's article called "The Cyclops and the Twelve-Eyed Toad; William James and the Unity-Disunity Problem" (1989).

The embracing of this alternative approach also seems consistent with Woodworth's particular view of a middle of the road psychology (which does not claim that the golden mean between any two extremes represents the views that will eventually prevail). Rather, as Woodworth warned:

"It may even happen that views that now seem altogether extreme will prove their merit… [and] be found to hold without regard to their relation to the slogans of the schools" (Woodworth, 1931, p. 232).

My argument, stated bluntly, is that the explicit adoption of pluralistic monism and direct perception may yet prove their merit for providing a viable unificationist position without adherence to positivist orthodoxy. The pluralism (and by extension the golden epistemological mean) position, by contrast, is actually not a position at all; it is the lack of one. The latter absolutist approach to the problem can never 'prove its merit' because it ill-logically rules out appeal to proof.

Systematic Reconceputalization Needed

In closing I wish to mention Woodworth's position on the second issue of the unity of the subject matter debate. Regarding the issue of working out the most adequate set of concepts for theoretically encapsulating the whole of psychology's subject matter Woodworth (1931) had the following to say:

"If you ask me which school is going to prove its case and win out--so forcing me against my will into the dangerous role of prophet--I shall answer, all and none" (p. 231).

Bearing in mind the present degree of dissatisfaction with not only the behaviorist and early cognitive science approaches but also with the litany of eclectic accounts of the interactionist era of research, one might now say that all of the traditional schools and mixed eclectic accounts of psychological subject matter to date have lacked the conceptual tools to deal with the objective contradictions within the subject matter. Those objective contradictions include: unity-diversity, mind-body, heredity-environment, individual-societal, subject-object, and internal-external.

Some sort of systematic reconceptualization of our subject matter is needed to bring us out of this second period of disciplinary eclecticism. Exactly how that would be accomplished goes beyond the bounds of the present discussion but let's link it back to Woodworth by suggesting that present-day middle of the road psychology should be open to the possibility of a new system. Certainly Woodworth was open to this possibility in 1931. Using his metaphor, general psychology has produced a "well-cultivated valley" of psychological practice "but the glaciers may come again" (Woodworth, 1931, pp. 222-223).

References:

Ballantyne, P.F. (1992). Three Kinds of Unification for Psychology. A paper for the Canadian Psychological Association, Quebec City, Canada, June 13, 1992.

Ballantyne, P.F. (1993). From Initial Abstractions to a Concrete Concept of Personality. Proceedings of the 5th biannual ISTP conference, Saclas, France, April, 1993. [Subsequently published: Ballantyne, P.F. (1995). From Initial Abstractions To A Concrete Concept Of Personality. In I. Lubek, et al. (Eds.). Recent Trends in Theoretical Psychology. Vol. 4., pp. 150-160. New York: Springer.]

Danziger, K. (1990). Constructing the Subject: Historical origins of psychological research. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Foster, J. (1987). An appeal for Objectivism in psychological metatheory. In Analysis of Psychological Theory. K.J. Gergen, T.B. Rogers, & H.J. Stam (Eds.). New York: Hemisphere.

Gergen, K.J. (1987). The language of psychological understanding. In K. Gergen, T. Rogers, H. Stam (Eds.). The Analysis of Psychological Theory: Metatheoretical perspectives. New York: Hemisphere.

Gibson, J. (1979). The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.

Hilgard, E. (1987). Psychology in America. Toronto: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.

James, W. (1909). A Pluralistic Universe. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Matarazzo, J.D. (1987). There is only One Psychology, No Specialties, but Many Applications. American Psychologist. 42, 893-903.

Staats, A.W. (1983). Psychology's Crisis of Disunity. New York: Praeger.

Stam, H. (1992). Deconstructing the Subject: Banishing the Ghost of Boring. Contemporary Psychology. 37, 629-632.

Tolman, C.W. (1988a). Theoretical unification in psychology: A materialist perspective (pp. 29-36). In W.J. Baker, et al. (Eds.). Recent Trends in Theoretical Psychology. New York: Springer-Verlag.

Tolman, C.W. (1989). Pluralistic Monism: William James as Closet Heraclitean. Psychological Record. 39, 177-194.

Tolman, C.W., & Lemery, C.R. (1990). How to reconcile theoretical differences in psychology. New Ideas in Psychology, 8, 397-402.

VandenBos, G.R. (1989). Loosely organized "Organized Psychology." American Psychologist. 44, 979-986.

Viney, W. (1989). The Cyclops and the Twelve-Eyed Toad: William James and the Unity-disunity problem in psychology. American Psychologist. 44, 1261-1265.

Wertheimer, M. (1988). Obstacles to the Integration of Competing Theories in Psychology. Philosophical Psychology. 1, 131-137.

Woodworth, R.S. (1931). Contemporary Schools of Psychology. London: Methuen & Co.

Woodworth, R.S. (1943). The Adolescence of American Psychology. Psyc. Review. 50, 10-32.