Philosophical basis of Psychological Science, Paul F. Ballantyne

History and Theory of Psychology: An early 21st century student's perspective

Appendix 2:

Basic Philosophical Choices, metatheory, and theory assessment methodology for a unified 21st century psychology.

Overview

This appendix provides you with a useful philosophical decision tree (see figure 1); defines the key terms used in it like "ontology" (what exists) or "epistemology" (how do we know); and highlights important positional affinities across the so-called ontological or epistemological divide. Some of these affinities are problematic while others are rather progressive. Stated rather negatively, most of the depicted affinities are tendencies of specific problematic epistemological positions to predispose one to believe in problematic ontological positions and vice versa. By way of highlighting these varied problematic affinities across the ontological or epistemological divide, however, it is hoped that your attention will be drawn to the more affirmative (progressive) point that the only viable combined philosophical basis of psychological science (or any other science) is a "Nonreductive Materialist ontology supported by a Direct Realist and Direct Perceptionist epistemology." This particular affinity is not merely complimentary, but "complementary" too. Its respective ontological and epistemological components add up to a sound and sustainable basic philosophy for science as well as for everyday life. For various reasons, the other affinities are ultimately inadequate for both applications.

As you read through this appendix, you will note that respective contrasts between three traditional scientific "metatheoretical" approaches (Positivism, Metaphysical pluralism, and Naturalistic emergentism) are mentioned with an explicit favoritism being in evidence for the latter "levels of analysis" and nonreductive "hierarchy of the sciences" approach (depicted in figure 2). The Naturalistic emergentist metatheory, is itself, supported by the above mentioned "viable" philosophical basis. Furthermore, the practical advantages of our careful adherence to it is that it promotes rather than hinders our ongoing efforts to solve the so-called "successor theory problem" in psychology. This point is highlighted and augmented by way of introducing a "combined" empirical or theoretical assessment methodology (see figure 3) which I believe follows the basic outline of Scheffler's (1967) "Standard view of science" and improves upon it too (see also Ballantyne, 1995).

Figure 1: Basic philosophical choices (After Ballantyne, 1991).

Figure 1 depicts the basic ontological and epistemological choices (defined below) which are necessary for any underlying philosophy of science or psychology (explicit or implicit). These basic choices are indicated in figure 1 by means of solid lines. Beyond this however, this figure indicates that there are clear affinities between the theory of perception held (indirect or direct), and the ontological position held by a given theorist, research tradition, school, or system of science. These higher-order affinities are indicated by means of dashed lines. Finally, the small dotted lines are indicative of the inevitable slips of one problematic position into another. Note that these "slips" operate on both respective sides of the ontological or epistemological divide. They also, however, operate across that divide (with all of the "Idealist" positions and all but one of the "Realist" positions ending up in epistemological solipsism or ontological agnosticism if followed to their ultimate conclusion). The major affirmational point to be made below is that the only "combined" philosophical position to escape such a slippery slope is a Nonreductive Materialist ontology supported by a Direct Realist and Direct Perceptionist epistemology. The affinities between those particular positions provide a viable philosophical basis for the Standard view of scientific investigation because they are necessary and sustainable rather than arbitrary and fleeting.

Part 1: Basic philosophical definitions

Whereas epistemology can loosely be defined as relating to the question: "How do we know?;" issues of ontology, can likewise be defined as concerning questions such as: "What is it that we know?; What exists?; and What is that made up of?" The basic ontological choice to be made, around which one adopts either a "Materialist" or an "Idealist" philosophical position but not both, is the one of deciding (or acting as if) "matter is prior to idea" or "idea is prior to matter." The basic epistemological choice to be made is one of adopting either a Realist or an Anti-realist "theory of knowledge." Any realist theory of knowledge assumes our access to reality or provides an argument for such access. Any anti-realist theory of knowledge will deny that such access is possible.

(I) Ontology

It may be necessary to provide a clear contrast here between the old "metaphysical" meaning and a modern progressive definition of ontology. The term metaphysics has traditionally been identified with doctrines of an eternally changeless reality and a mystical, religious, or nonscientific philosophy. Note that the term metaphysics, in this sense, is not a synonym for "philosophy." Dialectical materialists, for instance, explicitly distance themselves from what they call metaphysics but not from philosophy itself (see Boeselager, 1975).

As Lacey's Dictionary of Philosophy (1986) points out, metaphysics is still sometimes inadequately defined as the "study of nature in general." But this older definition was largely abandoned during the rise of modern secular philosophy. "Metaphysics" per se is better said to be concerned with issues which "arise out of, but go beyond, factual or scientific questions about the world" (Lacey, 1986, p. 143). Ontology on the other hand, is defined more simply as "the study of being and in particular, nowadays, what there is, e.g. material objects, [processes], minds, persons, … etc." (Lacey, p. 143).

(a) Use of the terms Materialism and Idealism. The two basic ontological positions of materialism and idealism, feature prominently in the differentiation between and the historically demonstrable practical outcome of three dominant scientific metatheories (which I call Positivism, Metaphysical pluralism, and Naturalistic emergentism). Oversimplification of what is meant by the terms materialism and idealism, however, has hindered an historically principled assessment of not only these scientific metatheories but also the resultant "systems or schools" of psychological science.

In this appendix (and elsewhere), therefore, I explicitly adopt the Feurebach-Engels view that there are:

"two and only two fundamental but opposing ... [ontological] alternatives: idealism according to which mind is primary in the universe and matter is created by or dependent upon mind; and materialism, according to which matter is the primary being and mind the subordinate and dependent feature of the world" (Acton, 1967, p. 390).

The scope of idealism as used here, includes positions such as Subjective Idealism (Protagoras, Berkeley, Hume), Objective Idealism (Plato, Locke, Kant), and Theism (Aquinas, Descartes); with the latter of being a traditional metaphysical doctrine based on "faith" and appealing to the existence of a God-given rational "soul" rather than mere appeal to empirical "evidence" (see Chapter 2 of Edna Heidbreder's text, 1933). The scope of materialism includes such positions as Vulgar or Mechanistic "Reductive Materialism" (Hobbes, Loeb, J.B. Watson); and Modern Functional, or Dialectical "Nonreductive Materialism" (James, Dewey, Baldwin; Marx, Engels, Bitsakis).

(II) Epistemology

The above more useful definition of ontology, needs to be distinguished not only from "traditional metaphysics" but also from the complementary philosophical endeavor called epistemology. As James Mark Baldwin (1957) pointed out:

"Thus ontology is no longer the general theory of being, distinct from its special forms; it is the theory of the known reality as distinct from the theory of the process of knowing [epistemology]. English thought probably owes to Ferrier that clear-cut recognition of this latter distinction of ontology and epistemology" (Baldwin, 1957, p. 204).

Various philosophical dictionaries, provide a broad definition of epistemology as: (i) a "branch of philosophy concerned with the nature and scope of knowledge, its presuppositions and basis, and the general reliability of claims to knowledge" (Hamlyn, 1967, pp. 8-9); or (ii) "the systemic analysis of conceptions employed by ordinary and scientific thought…" (Baldwin, 1957, p. 333).

(a) Realism, Anti-Realism, Naive Realism; Direct and Indirect Perception. Figure 1 shows the basic epistemological choice of Realism being further divided up into a choice between adopting "Indirect" or "Direct" Realist positions. The support of a Direct Realist theory of knowledge entails a further choice between adherence to an Indirect or Direct theory of perception. The very possibility of adopting this latter "Direct perception" position, however, was not recognized openly until the late 1960s (see Gibson, 1966; Reed, & Jones, 1982; Reed, 1987, 1988; Lombardo, 1987).

The challenge for Direct Realists prior to that time, therefore, has been to develop a sufficient conception of perception in which an "essential connection" between human perception and an objectively existing world is recognized (Hamlyn, 1967, p. 38). That is, to come up with a theory of perception which explains how human knowledge corresponds with the world of objects, events, or processes.

Even within the Realist and Direct Realist camps there are two kinds of answers to the so-called "problem of knowledge" (the problem of giving a rational account of the assumed connection between consciousness and reality). The most recently developed answer (Direct perception) is that we perceive things directly and objectively (veridically); the more commonly utilized answer (Indirect perception) is that we perceive things only indirectly and therefore subjectively -through the "effects which they produce upon us" (Lowry, 1982, p. 13).

As indicated by the dashed lines of figure 1, the most recent Direct Perceptionist option is consistent with a Nonreductive Materialist ontology (which assumes the primacy of matter as the initial premise upon which all further evidence is based) and also asserts a Direct Realism which advocates the correspondence of our thoughts with the world we live in. The more traditional and problematic Indirect perceptionist option, however, is most consistent with an Idealist ontology (which assumes the primacy of ideas as the initial premise upon which all further evidence is based); and thus either openly asserts or slips into an Indirect realism.

This Idealist position, itself, is split up further into Objective Idealism which accepts the existence of objects in the world but denies our ability to reach them with our perceptual apparatus (Kant); and Subjective Idealism which goes as far as to deny the existence of objects in the world (Berkeley) stating that they are only complex constructions of the human mind.

A third, so-called "Realist" position, Naive Realism (a special form of noncommittal epistemological Agnosticism) is not shown in figure 1 but had attempted an intermediary position which states that although we only perceive the world indirectly, we can still know the world objectively through other means like the "practical criteria" of everyday life (I. Scheffler, 1967; F. Cunningham, 1973). While that position was useful in asserting a rationale for scientific endeavor during a period in which all of the fundamental premises of Direct Realism and Objective idealism were being openly debated (1930-1979), it has not proved to be sustainable in the long-run.

What has historically been missing in the vast majority of Direct or Naive (a.k.a., "Critical") realist arguments is a supportive theory of Direct perception (Lombardo, 1987). Consequently, successive attempts along these lines have lacked the argumentative force by which to drive the point of scientific "objectivity" -reciprocity of the perceiver and objects in the world- home in other than consensus-dependent or pragmatic terms (which are in turn vulnerable to idealist and anti-realist positions of all stripes).

Naive realism provided a temporary safe harbor for empirically-minded scientists who were fed up with the seemingly endless epistemological debates of the pre-1970s era of philosophy of science. It is suggested here, however, that the Direct theory of perception (J.J. Gibson, 1966, 1979) is the only nondogmatic support for an epistemological Realist position and for scientific objectivity itself. That is, it is the only way to avoid slipping into the Skepticism (hence Solipsism) so characteristic of the anti-realist, indirect realist, and even naive or critical realist positions.

Elaboration (1): What is Direct Perception?

Argument from Direct perception. Direct perception is the supportive argumentative tool which the above Naive or Direct realists were missing in their epistemological arguments for the objectivity of scientific discourse or practice. Rather than the usual half self-refuting indirect realism, or the progressive but vulnerable stand-alone direct or naive realisms (see Wilcox & Katz, 1984), direct access to the indicators of perceptual or scientific veridicality is allowed more consistently by the adoption of an explicitly outlined direct perception theory. Gibson's direct perception was a movement away from previous sensation-based theory, toward an information-based understanding of perception. Direct perception is opposed to both traditional "empiricist" and "nativist" views of perception because both assumed that perception involves an enrichment process (Lombardo, 1987, p. 87). Instead of postulating that the brain constructs information from the input of the sensory nerves, Gibson proposed that the centers of the nervous system -including the brain- are transparent to structured ambient light (and other forms of structured) information from the environment.

"The brain is relieved of the necessity of constructing such information by any process -innate rational powers (theoretical nativism), the storehouse of memory (empiricism), or form-fields (Gestalt theory)" (Gibson, 1966, p. 267).

The meaning of direct. The "direct" in direct perception means simply that the traditional conception of "sensation" (as a middle segment -of a linear three moment sequence- which stands as a "barrier" between the object and the accomplishment of a perception about it) is thrown out. Instead, sensations (redefined as conscious awareness of the stimulation of sensory organs) are considered as "incidental," and "not essential" to the ongoing perceptual process of information pickup (1966, p. 56; 1979, pp. 54-55, p. 246). Sensations are to be reinterpreted as auxiliary to the process of perception itself. Thus the main traditional bastion (fortified areas of a position) for arguing that a linear passive mechanical chain of sensory processes occludes the perceiver from direct contact with the world is demolished. In its place, Gibson provided a novel higher-order description of the causal process, previously unknown in perception theory (his "perceptual systems" account).

(a) Perceptual systems. Gibson (1966) carefully distinguished between the level of analysis applicable to stimulus energy and stimulus information respectively. The active perceptual systems are contrasted with passive sensory receptors upon which they rely (in a causally contingent manner) but to which they are not reducible. Perceptual systems yield an awareness of objects, an awareness that does not necessarily include any awareness of the receptors stimulated (see Reed & Jones, 1982, p. 375).

The various sensory receptors (e.g., mechanoreceptors, chemoreceptors, olfactory buds, photoreceptors) of an organism are threshold exhibiting units functioning at the physical, chemical, and biological levels of existence. The perceptual systems of an organism (e.g., touch, taste, smell, auditory, visual) which show greater plasticity, function at a higher psychological-ecological level. As Gibson points out:

"One sees the environment not with the eyes but with the eyes-in-the-head-on-the-body-resting-on-the-ground…. The perceptual capacities of the organism do not lie in discrete anatomical parts of the body, but lie in systems with nested functions" (1979, p. 205).

(b) Ontological hierarchy. Gibson's 1966 work exhibited clearly the nested ontological hierarchy both between and within such systems (p. 42). Perception is not reducible to, nor explainable simply by a combination of lower sensory receptor firings because it exhibits distinct emergent properties. The receptors carry the external structure of the stimulus energy flux to the nervous system, but it is stimulus information that is picked-up by the perceiving organism. The simple stimulation of receptors is necessary but not sufficient for perception to take place (Gibson, 1966). Later in Shaw & Bransford (1977), the receptor irritability and neural activity were conceived of as "mediums" which are under normal circumstances "transparent" to structured invariances from the external objects and events which produced them (p. 30). They are evolutionarily selected transparent purveyors of the relevant structure of stimulus energy.

The difference between the two levels of analysis can be seen in the following example of abnormal conditions: For example, while driving up the crest of a rain soaked highway onramp after the sun has burnt off the overlying cloud cover, the receptors in your eyeballs will be highly "stimulated" but only a blinding glare (and not the pickup of relevant information) -a "perception" properly speaking- is achieved. To continue driving one must see the road. That's why we keep our sunglasses handy (see Gibson 1966 Chap. XIV for other instances of "deficient perception").

Elaboration (2): Why should we care about Direct perception?

Disciplinary significance of Direct perception. Gibson's solution to the problem of knowledge, solves many of the long-standing questions posed by the largely hegemonic Indirect (Representationalist) theory of perception -which had been the starting place of the analytic philosophers (e.g., Ryle, Witgenstein), the "Logical positivists" of the 1920s through 1930s, as well as the "operationist" movement in psychology which followed thereafter.

"An important innovation of this [Gibsonian] theory was to redefine perception as the pickup of information over time. The inclusion of time and motion is significant. It goes a long way toward freeing us of the photography metaphor that has so generously supported representationalism" (Tolman, 1986b, p. 130).

As Charles Tolman puts it, "representationalism" (indirect perception) has made a great deal out of "mistaken perceptions" (e.g., thinking the telephone is ringing while one is in the shower). But Gibson demonstrates that it was not the perception that was mistaken, it was the judgment about the content or source of that perception. It is not the object which is constructed (as the Idealists claim), it is our judgment about which object produced the information that is mistaken (the ear is carrying very similar stimulus information in both these specially limited cases -phone and water vibration). The objects when investigated perceptually by the active inquiring human being over time, will (in Gibson's terms) afford relevant "variances and invariances" (e.g., one ring versus many) which are picked up directly but which still have to be differentiated. The theory of direct perception therefore provides a direct objective but non-absolute link with objects in the world.

(a) Improvement on the Standard view of science. These facts regarding the directness of the perceptual processes provide an appealing basal link (observation of the object) to Scheffler's (1967) "Standard view of science" -which was portrayed as being a three-tiered structure consisting of objects, descriptive empirical laws about them, and theoretical laws which attempt to answer "why" questions (explaining the variances and invariance of empirical laws). With enough information of the correct type, scientists can in principle come to veridical opinions about their disciplinary subject matter. That is, one could choose between two separate theories by virtue of their respective correspondence with the object as exemplified through active experimental and demonstrative investigations over time. Cunningham and Scheffler were thus both justified in their advocacy of "objectivity" in science, but are now provided with a more cogent perceptual theory to support their viewpoint.

(b) Non-absolute knowledge. This is not an absolute (all knowing or for all time) objectivity in the metaphysical sense. We never know everything about our subject matter, but rather we are always getting to know more via our active investigations of the subject matter. Our knowledge about psychology, although often veridical, is always relative to that which we don't yet know. This dialectical (double-edged) aspect of scientific knowledge is exemplified in the fact that whenever we sufficiently answer a given empirical or theoretical question, this leads to other questions. Equally, some of the apparent logical contradictions between competing theories may in fact be related to objective contradictions in the developmental nature of the subject matter itself. This dialectical relationship between the known and the yet to be known brings up another important point.

(c) Materialist Dialectics and Direct perception work together. It is the combination of both materialist dialectics and direct perception which produces a nondogmatic solution to the question of the possibility of objectivity in science. In differential interpretations regarding scientific subject matter, there is an amount of adumbration (construction), but this is conceptualization of information from the object and not construction (constitution) of the object itself. This combined ontological and epistemological approach is the proper foundation which best provides us with the possibility of a nondogmatic, systematic understanding of the upward movement from facts to theory, as well as the successive movement from theory to theory over the historical course of a given discipline (see Ballantyne, 1995).

Part 2: Complementary affinities between Ontology and Epistemology

One can not without great difficulty, talk about what is known without talking about how it is known and vice versa. Although notable past figures have -to varying degrees of success as well as in varying directions- accomplished tightrope walking feats of philosophical agnosticism, this meant that they had to live with the consequences of having done so. These consequences include the production of inconsistent, embarrassingly self-serving, dogmatic or even ultimately irrelevant or counterproductive accounts of their particular discipline or subdiscipline.

(I) Variant tendencies in Ontological and Epistemological Positions

Since the history of science and philosophy are so very intimately intertwined, any competent consideration of even the most common variants is best accomplished by way of careful reference to the specific positions of notable figures in a given discipline (like physics, biology, or psychology). Our simplified diagram (figure 1), for instance, does not even contain the terms phenomenology or phenomenalism which were highly influential epistemological positions in the history of psychology with distinct links to ontologically idealist positions. Having stated those limitations, however, I hope that our diagram will suffice to make a few basic points. Figure 1, for instance, indicates (by means of dashed lines) that a given Objective idealist can be either an epistemological direct realist or an indirect realist. It also indicates that while Reductive materialists tend to be Indirect realists, Nonreductive materialists tend to be Direct realists.

Note too, however, that the epistemological side of the diagram indicates (by means of solid lines) that while a Direct realist can appeal to either a direct or an indirect theory of perception, the same can not be said of an Indirect realist (who is stuck with some form or other of indirect perception theory). As already mentioned above, both Direct realism and "Naive realist" positions have historically allowed their adherents much more discursive wiggle room especially when they are linked up with an appeal to a nonreductive materialist ontology. Indirect realism, in contrast is a discursively constricted position which tends to be linked with an appeal to either some form of ontological idealism or a reductive materialism.

With respect to which choices are best to make, and what the implications are for empirical methods or theory choice in psychology (or any other scientific discipline), some rather far-reaching points can be made by contrasting these "variants" in philosophical positions with the far less numerous, though equally important "invariant" tendencies which follow.

(II) Consistent (invariant) tendencies in philosophical positions.

In modern philosophical positions, we find some rather striking invariant consistencies. These invariants are indicated in figure 1 by means of dotted lines. On the ontological side of the diagram, we see that Objective Idealist positions -which attempt to provide some access to the world (e.g., Locke, Kant)- slip inevitably into Subjective Idealism (e.g., Berkeley, Hume). On the epistemological side of the diagram, we find that Skeptical (anti-realist) positions slip inevitably into full-blown Solipsisms. Also on the epistemological side, we find that any Direct realism which happens to rely upon an Indirect perception theory, slips likewise into a Skepticism -and hence Solipsism (see Wilcox & Katz, 1984; Foster, 1987).

(III) How these philosophical tendencies relate to each other

First, it should be reiterated that Indirect perception theories tend to both lead to and follow from ontological idealism (see dashed lines). Whether intended or not, explicitly stated or not, there is an undeniably problematic mutuality between them. Both positions are fatally flawed because they do not support making any truth claims.

Second, since all (objective or subjective) idealisms rely upon indirect perception they end logically (via Skepticism) in a dogmatic Solipsism. Ontological idealism always falls prey to the slippery epistemological slope.

Third, any explicit materialist position (whether of the reductive or nonreductive type) which happens to rely upon an indirect perception, ends likewise in a dogmatic Solipsism (via the implicit idealism and skepticism invoked by representationalism). This is always the case whether or not the adherent also claims to be a "direct realist" or not.

Finally, direct perception both relies upon and supports an nonreductive materialism. There is a necessary and practical mutuality between them. Direct perception theory would not exist without nonreductive materialist arguments and any form of anti-reductionism or integrative levels theory can not stand on its own. This point can be made by noting that the anti-reductionist aspects of successive phenomenology movements and naive realist research traditions rely in the final analysis on objective idealism; and are therefore vulnerable to anti-realist attack. One of the most notable anti-realist research traditions to have been developed in 20th century psychology was that of S.S. Steven's (1935a&b, 1939) so-called metaphysically agnostic "operationism" approach. Neither the contemporaneous phenomenological nor the Naive (a.k.a., "critical") realist research traditions possessed the proper philosophical basis to deal adequately with such an anti-realist attack on their most fundamental assumptions about the objectivity of pscychological endeavor. The discipline of psychology is still struggling to overcome the rather constrictive though pervasive impact of operationism on accepted empirical practice and attitudes toward theory construction.

In other words and at least partially by default, the only defensible philosophical basis for objective psychological science is a nonreductive ontological materialism (e.g., functional or dialectical materialism) supported by (and supporting) an epistemological direct perception (see Tolman, 1987c; 1988, 1989).

Elaboration 3:
Naturalism, Aristotelian laws, Dialectical laws.

(I) Naturalism progressively defined. Danto (1967) called naturalism a species of philosophical monism according to which whatever exists is natural and susceptible to explanation through methods exemplified in the natural sciences. It is a repudiation of the old metaphysical (Theistic) view that there exists or could exist any entities or events beyond the scope of scientific explanation. With all due respect to the fourteen tenants of the typical naturalist outline by Danto, I suggest that his definition is far too diffuse for our purposes.

But Danto did make a crucial point. There is a "philosophical heterogeneity" of "otherwise rival ontologies" present in naturalism making the position a "methodological [procedural, official] rather than an ontological monism" (Danto, 1967, p. 448). This situation sometimes results in the claim that naturalism is ontologically "neutral" including "dualists, idealists, materialists, atheists, or nonatheists, as the case may be" (Danto, 1967, p. 448).

While any useful definition of the naturalist position would need to correct this ontological ambiguity in other disciplines, it should also correct for the past ontological naiveté of its particular expression in psychological discourse. Danziger (1990) nicely outlines the problems of that naiveté:

"Those volumes of historical readings that present brief extracts from various writers grouped by topic…. [imply] that while various authors have had different opinions… each topic… corresponds to some fixed objective entity… What this… historical material overlooks is… [that] the very objects of psychological discourse, and not just opinions about them have changed… in the course of history" (Danziger, p. 336).

Even more unacceptable is the fairly hostile and narrow-minded treatment of naturalism present in Bugger & Baker (1972). Naturalism is described there as a philosophical view which gives a decisive or exclusive role to nature directing itself "one-sidedly" to its biological dimension (a.k.a., Biologism), and which considers specifically human abilities as a mere extension of the biological order to the principles of physical science (p. 268).

It should be noted that while Danziger (1990) avoids presenting naturalism in this latter narrow (biologized) light, he rejects naturalism (as defined by him) in favor of an equally precarious form of historicized ontological agnosticism:

"By naturalism I mean the approach that proceeds from the assumption that the objects, processes, or events to which our theoretical concepts refer have natural existence before the act of discovery that leads to their labeling…. The notion of generative metaphor points in a very different direction. It suggests that we treat the objects of… discourse not as things… lying around waiting to be discovered, but as the product of generative schemata applied across various domains" (Danziger, 1990, p. 335).

Fortunately for us, a more open-minded view of naturalism was already implied by Baldwin (1957). Baldwin made a distinction between what can here be called a traditional (biologized-ahistorical) and a progressive (nonreductive-historical) form of naturalism.

The traditional biologized form which Baldwin associated with the "positivist" and reductive "materialist" camps is defined as follows:

"The theory that the whole of the universe or of experience may be accounted for by a method like that of the physical sciences, and with recourse only to the current conceptions of physical and natural science; more specifically, that mental and moral processes may be reduced…" (p. 138).

According to Baldwin, the more progressive form of naturalism "simply limits itself to what is natural or normal in its explanations, as against appeal to what transcends nature as a whole, or is… supernatural or mystical" (p. 138). In this more progressive meaning, the distinction between the adjectives "natural" and "physical" is stressed in particular with reference to the mental and moral questions in science as opposed to those in the physical sciences. Baldwin urged that it is "extremely desirable that this distinction of usage should be recognized" because it allows "the meaning of natural to include man" (p. 138). Within such an expanded scope of natural scientific investigation, many formerly excluded questions with clear relevance to human concerns (such as social-cultural comparisons of ethics, religious beliefs, gender or ethnic identity, and even political ideology) would thereby be included.

(II) The Ontological basis of Naturalism. Since Baldwin's distinction has allowed us to avoid narrow caricatures (e.g., Bugger & Baker) and hopeless befuddlement (e.g., Danto) of the naturalistic position, it should also allow us to push the argument one step farther by commenting on the proper ontological basis of progressive naturalist methodology. The traditional forms of reductive naturalism are associated with positivism and mechanistic materialism whereas the progressive form is associated with both functional and dialectical materialism.

It is certainly to this more progressive nonreductive form of naturalism that the functional materialist philosopher O.J. Flanagan (1984) refers when he writes:

"Naturalism you might say, is what you get when you take classical (say, Cartesian or Newtonian) materialism and reconstitute it with evolutionary concepts, in particular with the concept of different levels of… organization and the concept of organisms as functional systems which continually change by interacting with other functional systems" (p. 24).

Such naturalists view the world as comprised of physical objects, their properties, and relations but depart from reductive materialism by "denying that mental phenomena, naturalistically interpreted, require a simple mechanical analysis" (Flanagan, p. 24). The progressive naturalist then, "parts company with the reflex mechanist [e.g., J.B. Watson] by reading evolutionary theory as pointing not merely to increasing complexity of biological organization but also as pointing to the need for increasing complexity at the level of explanation as we ascend the phylogenetic scale: reflexes require reflex analyses, full-blown mental phenomena require mental analyses" (Flanagan, p. 24).

It seems then that naturalistic methodology has matured to a stage in which it is not and can not be ontologically neutral, ambiguous, or naive. The choice has been narrowed to one or other types of nonreductive materialism. I shall therefore use the term "naturalistic" in what follows in this progressive and ontologically partisan manner.

(III) Naturalistic Emergentism and Scientific Laws. These naturalistic and emergentist trends combine to provide a cosmological view which is optimistic for the possibility of both human knowledge and scientific endeavor. For example the two prior metatheoretical understandings of scientific discourse (positivism and metaphysical pluralism) had postulated a false logical dichotomy between a static unity and an undifferentiated plurality account of the universe (see Boeselager, 1975; Hanfling, 1981). The actual situation, however, is more accurately described as dynamic, integrated, and emergent relations between different levels of nature (a.k.a. naturalistic emergentism).

Under this latter metatheoretical understanding of scientific discourse, adequate examination of the world entails the search for numerous principles that exist on a hierarchy of increasing complexity, being layered (nested) one within the other, by virtue of the evolutionary (and socio-historical) developmental nature of matter.

The significance of this cosmological view is that it can be applied profitably to outline the nature of scientific laws and in doing so, the relation between the various sciences which try to discover those natural laws (a.k.a. unity of the sciences).

As Bitsakis (1987) points out:

"The laws of nature are local: they correspond to the structures and relations existing in a certain phase of the evolution of the part of the universe under consideration. (The laws of biology do not exist in the sun and they were nonexistent on earth some billions of years ago). More than that: It is possible that the 'eternal' laws of nature and the 'universal constants of physics' are functions of space and time, as Mach, Dirac and others contend…" (p. 403).

Figure 2 The Naturalistic Emergentist Hierarchy of Sciences (After Ballantyne, 1991)

Sociological	Law1.........L(n)	Sociology
Psychological	Law1........L(n)	Psychology
Biological	Law1.......L(n)	Biology
Chemical	Law1......L(n)	Chemistry
Physical	Law1.....L(n)	Physics

Figure 2. Four features of the Naturalistic emergentist metatheory can be characterized as follows: (1) an explicit recognition of the continuity and discontinuity between various levels of nature (left); (2) an increasing number of non-reducible laws depending upon the complexity of each new qualitatively distinct but related level of existence (center); (3) the science produced to study the subject matter of each level (right) will reflect its evolutionary, developmental, and socio-historical relations with the other levels; and (4) an understanding of perception as both epistemologically direct and ontologically mediated by the lower levels of existence (not shown here but expressed explicitly elsewhere).

The understanding of scientific laws as local indicates that new laws emerge with the changing nature of matter. In this aspect, naturalistic emergentism is in distinct contrast with both the positivist and the metaphysical pluralist metatheories (the latter of which Danziger falls into). Their shared assumption was that scientific laws were necessarily universal and unchanging. The positivists suggested a variety of formalized methodologies aimed at capturing objective (eternal) laws and the metaphysical pluralist doubted the possibility of ever obtaining any such objective scientific laws (see Kolakowski, 1972; Hanfling, 1981). In fact, it was this basic misunderstanding as to the nature of scientific laws that was the source of the problem. The naturalistic emergentist influences on our thought, however, have allowed us to recognize the dynamic relationship between the laws of science and the levels of nature which they attempt to describe.

Formal logic and Dialectical logic. The source of the traditional mechanistic theory of development in positivist thought is said to reside in the so-called laws of nature and correct thinking as stated by Aristotle. Somerville (1967) nicely contrasts the Aristotelian view of correct thinking (a.k.a., formal logic) with the dialectical view of correct thinking (a.k.a., dialectical logic). His point is that what is called "Aristotelian logic" is not to be identified with "logic itself" or with the logic of things (pp. 42-43).

The Aristotelian maxims (which are simply summarized statements about the necessarily assumed consistency between the nouns or predicates used in the various propositions of a given ontological argument) have come to be known as: (1) Law of Identity (A is A); (2) Law of Noncontradiction (A is not non-A); and (3) Law of Excluded Middle (Any X is either A or non-A). Instances of each are found throughout Aristotle's Metaphysics and Posterior Analytics. In both works, one gets the distinct impression that these maxims are intended by him as a guide to consistent and clear discourse about the "subject" (the nouns) being referred to in a given argument. They are, in other words, being presented (primarily) as an analytical aid which might help promote clear and logical discourse about being (nature) rather than bold-faced statements about the nature of being per se.

Having (perhaps) overlooked this somewhat subtle latter distinction, it is understandable why Somerville mistakenly claims that "what Aristotle sees as the most basic characteristic of existence is [its] static self-identity" (p. 45). But this characterization is, in fact, more indicative of Plato's absolutized ontological dualism and the equally absolutized materialist monism of 17th through 18th century mechanical views on nature than of Aristotle.

With specific regard to Somerville's encapsulation of the three Aristotelian maxims of deductive logical discourse as such, however, I believe he does a slightly better job:

"[Aristotle's] three laws really make the same [discursive] point from three different angles; positively, by saying that a thing can be only what it is; negatively, by saying that a thing cannot be what it is not; and dichotomously, by saying that there are only two alternatives -to be A or not to be A- and they are mutually exclusive" (Somerville, 1967, p. 45).

As "principles" (or rules) that govern the use of language in such ontological arguments, Aristotle's maxims are as valid and important today as they ever were. They were also, however, but one of the varied analytical tools (including observation and his theory of four causes) that Aristotle utilized to avoid adopting unreasonable, absolutized, or otherwise "extreme" arguments. Regardless of which of his works you look at, "change" in the physical (material) world or in living bodies is depicted as "always" directed toward "what is opposite or intermediate" (e.g., see De Anima, Book II, Part 4). Aristotle, therefore, seems to have recognized the limitations of his maxims with regard to specific cases or instances of dynamic or developing "being" but others, alas, did not.

Anyway, in contrast to the 'mechanical world view' (wherever it may be found) materialist dialectics holds that the basic rules of correct thinking should reflect a universe not in which the static and changeless is at the core (e.g., Plato; Aristotle's theory of forms; and 17th-18th century mechanistic accounts) but in which change and development is at the core.

The dialectical maxims of correct thinking, which subsume not only the "three" deductive Aristotelian maxims of clear discourse but also his more inductive theory of "four" causes, are as follows: (1) Law of Unity and Struggle of Opposites: Every object or process develops into something else, not only because it is affected by some external force but also because the very components out of which it is made force changes (change is built-in to its existence); (2) Law of Transition from Quantitative to Qualitative Change: Development cannot take place without discontinuity; and (3) Law of Negation: Every new stage, while synthesizing in itself the progressive trend of previous stages, contains within itself the preconditions for further development (see Cornforth, 1952). In brief, the first dialectical law says that every particular thing has a history as well as an end; the second, that the history is qualitative as well as quantitative; the third, that this kind of history does not stop (Somerville, 1967, p. 67).

These "dialectical" laws are presented as conclusions arrived at on the basis of the factual evidence rather than as a priori "principles." Even though these analytically derived dialectical dynamics are regarded as universal (found in everything), it is not claimed that the specific empirical or theoretical laws of each particular level of reality (physical, chemical, biological, psychological, etc.) can be deduced from them. While dialectical logic in its function as a tool of analysis provides broad methodological guidelines it "does not obviate the necessity of finding, in each new case, the specific cause, the concrete pattern of change" (Somerville, 1967, p. 74). Materialist dialectics therefore provides a strategy of approach to the empirical investigation of phenomena rather than a detached (abstract) catalogue of logical contradictions (e.g., cause/effect, necessity/chance, possibility/reality, essence/appearance) to seek. What the specific objective contradictions of particular (concrete) objects (or even general levels of nature) are, and how these become resolved by way of development (e.g., mechanical, phylogenetic, ontogenetic, or sociohistorical change), constitute the very questions for empirical scientists in the various fields of knowledge to discover, justify, and ultimately explain theoretically (After Konstantinov, 1974, p. 146).

Implications of Dialectical logic. The careful utilization of dialectical logic during our rational consideration of past empirical evidence or of contemporary theory respectively, helps us in various ways. It helps us recognize and avoid reductive or static accounts. It helps us order past empirical endeavors from divergent sources into some emergent evolutionist context, and it guides our ongoing efforts to assess existing theories, select between alternative theories or produce better ones.

(a) Support of emergentism and progressive naturalism. The dialectical materialists have fine-tuned the argument for emergent evolution to an extent not present in either its early Western psychological proponents (such as C.L. Morgan) or any of the early to late 20th century functional psychologists. The problem with functional materialism has been that although it is distinctly opposed to both physicalist reduction and to ontological dualism (e.g., mind-body parallelism), it is "not in principle incompatible with [ontological] idealism" (Dubrovskii, 1987, p. 65). Indeed we saw this compatibility with idealism even in Morgan's early emergentist arguments for accepting a deity as an organizer of nature. While Morgan was correct that some higher emergent level exists beyond the individual human being, he failed to recognize that it the social-historical rather than immaterial realm toward which we must look for the origins of such "organization." The unswerving ontological materialism of materialist dialectics has in contrast allowed them to suggest that the law of quantitative to qualitative transformation is the key to understanding the self-movement of nature, mind, scientific knowledge, and society (Konstantinov, 1974, p. 131, p. 140).

The dialectical materialist philosophy seems to provide a more consistent general methodological approach and ontological grounding for progressive naturalism and the emergent view of mental evolution than was present in stand-alone functional materialism (see Tolman, 1987a, b, & c). This accounts in part for the term "integrative levels" being used by the dialectical materialists to distance themselves from the idealist and Theistic varieties of emergentism. Dubrovskii went so far as to point out that "one cannot at the same time acknowledge emergence and emphatically reject dialectics" [as William James himself did] without being guilty of a logical contradiction (1987, p. 68).

(b) Helping solve the successor theory problem. When dialectical logic and levels theory is applied to the successor theory problem, it becomes apparent that many of the past disciplinary controversies in psychology are reflective of the objective contradictions. To some extent these objective contradictions exist between the differing "research emphasis" or investigatory techniques utilized (e.g., experimental versus individual differences measurements), but they also "reside within" the developmental nature of the psychological processes under scientific investigation themselves.

Under formal (either/or) logic, the truth status of any given empirical law or theory was apparently called into question due to the vicissitudinous history of scientific consensus across various eras of inquiry. As the metaphysical pluralists (e.g., Kuhn, Koch, Gergen) pointed out, a given scientific theory, empirical law, or research tradition does not tend to totally supplant its rivals because there are always issues left open (or even neglected) by it and because it is itself eventually superseded by another theory, law, or tradition. Both positivism and metaphysical pluralism used this lack of total succession or completeness in knowledge claims as a basis for their arguments that the truth status of a law, or theory would need to be redefined. We are now, however, in a position to recognize that it was their idealist Humean Empiricism (which associated knowledge with certainty) coupled with an Aristotelian understanding of Laws (as universal and everlasting) which made the objective contradictions of competing or succeeding theories appear to be merely logical contradictions (of opinion or consensus) in the first place.

The usefulness of applying dialectical logic to the successor theory question is that it allows us to see that theoretical progression in a discipline does not and need not mean formal either/or negation of past attempts as an end point. Instead, theoretical progression involves a dialectical transcending ("sublation" by new negation of prior negation) which entails a continuing process of improvement without an endpoint. Bitsakis outlines this as follows:

"The two theories in question are... [recognizably] distinct. At the same time, the new one accepts the old as limited or as a special case (this is the case of Galilean and relativistic [Einsteinian] mechanics or of the Newtonian and relativistic theories of gravitation). Scientific becoming [i.e., theoretical progress] is not identical with a series of 'paradigms,' [Kuhn] nor is it a series of 'trials and errors' [Popper]. It is the acquisition of objective truths through the mutual determination of theory and practice" (Bitsakis, 1987, p. 409).

Given that dialectical materialist logic and its related naturalistic "levels" account can help us conceptualize our world more fully by escaping the problematic tendencies of reductionism and either/or logic, it should not be surprising that Bitsakis explicitly argued that such an account is properly "placed within" (complementary with) an evolutionarily contextualized "realist epistemology." Bitsakis, however, was not particularly clear regarding the underlying perception theory implied. I have already stated (more than once) above that the Gibsonian theory of direct perception is the one and only consistent option here.

Part 3: Metatheoretical positions on theoretical unity and their practical implications

The above discussion has been fairly broad and even removed from what empirical psychological scientists do on a daily basis. But by way of noting the respective disciplinary influence of the three generalized history of science matatheories we will now endeavor to indicate what the practical implications are for assessing particular empirical and theoretical positions in the discipline.

First, in the positivist metatheory (e.g., Comte, the Mills, Mach; and later Schlick, Carnap, Popper too) we see an objectivist materialism being undermined by both its methodologically explicit reductive "physicalist language" tendencies, and by an implicit acceptance of Humean Skeptical epistemology. As a result of those combined tendencies a dogmatic, "monolithic," and often reductive conception of "unification between the sciences" was put forward (see Passmore, 1967; Kolakowski, 1972; Hanfling, 1981). In psychology, the operationism of S.S. Stevens was aimed at "stabilizing" the discipline by way of reducing all theoretical terms (concepts) to empirically observable events and "putting an end to any possibility of revolutions" in the discipline.

Secondly, in metaphysical pluralism (e.g., Hanson, Kuhn), we see an idealist backlash against positivist physicalism, and a continuation of a more explicit Skeptical epistemology, calling outwardly for support from an indirect theory of perception (see Klemke et al., 1980; Kourany, 1987). An appeal to either an incommensurable theoretical "pluralism" (e.g., Gergen, Koch) or a "constructivist" pluralism of investigatory "metaphors" (Danziger) are just two of the many manifestations of that metatheory in psychology.

In contrast to these two failed metatheoretical attempts, we see in naturalistic emergentism both the assertion of a nonreductive materialism (e.g., Marx; Lenin; G.H. Lewes; James; Dewey), and the eventual development of a direct perceptionist epistemology (Gibson; Lombardo; E. Reed; C.W. Tolman) which supports and is supported by its ontological foundation. It is this metatheory that allows us the hope of eventually obtaining a nondogmatic historical account of the disciplinary succession of scientific systems, schools, and theories in any particular science. That is, it provides a generalized means of procedure for considering the so-called successor theory "problem." Under naturalistic emergentism a nondogmatic understanding of the unity between the sciences, of subject matter, and of theoretical unification is attainable in principle. This at least is my understanding of the present disciplinary situation in psychology (see Ballantyne, 1991, 1992, 1993) and I suspect that it is also the case in other disciplines as well.

Empirical and Theoretical assessment Methodology

On par in disciplinary importance with the above described viable scientific ontology, epistemology, and metatheory is the attainment and application of a non-arbitrary empirical/theoretical assessment methodology which follows the rough outline of Scheffler's Standard view of science (see Tolman & Lemery, 1990; Ballantyne, 1995). Only through applying such a methodology consistently can nondogmatic criteria for the production, assessment, and selection between successive positions in given areas or subdisciplines of psychology be attainable. Thus, by mentioning the above philosophical definitions and metatheoretical choices, we have been attempting to address with equal weight both the larger questions of science and the current crisis of theoretical relevance in psychology.

Figure 3. Combined methodology for assessing the maturity of empirical and theoretical positions (After Ballantyne, 1995).

Scheffler	Davydov	Ilyenkov
Theoretical	Substantial General	Concrete Conception (Explanation)
Empirical		Concrete Description
	Abstract General	Initial Generalization
		Initial Abstraction

Figure 3 shows the complementary terms used by Scheffler, Davydov, and Ilyenkov to describe various levels of discursive maturity. Scheffler's (1967/1982) distinction between the empirical and theoretical levels of science is effectively equivalent to Davydov's (1984) distinction between abstract and substantial generalization as well as Ilyenkov's (1982) distinction between initial abstraction, initial generalization, and concrete conception. The category of "concrete description" has been added to expand Scheffler's "empirical" level of investigation upwardly and thereby utilize his Standard view of science to fuller effect.

For Davydov and Ilyenkov, "theory" is this higher, concrete, form of rational generalization. Scheffler (1967/1982), however, tended to use the term to refer to empirical generalization (initial or abstract generalization in Ilyenkov and Davydov's terms). This left his outline vulnerable to anti-objectivism which trades on the indeterminacy of abstract empirical investigations.

In figure 3, therefore, Scheffler's empirical level of investigation (in which data is collected) has been "stretched" to include three stages called "initial abstraction, initial generalization and concrete description." This conforms to the view shared by Davydov and Ilyenkov that most empirical research is "abstract" (e.g., artificial experimental milieus, generalized statistical correlations among surface features), while only some of it is "concrete" (e.g., non-obtrusive observation, careful longitudinal studies). Scheffler's notion of the empirically retentive nature of successive theoretical conceptions and scientific eras, however, is preserved in the resulting "four-tiered" view of science.

"When one hypothesis is superseded by another, the genuine facts it had purported to account for are not inevitably lost; they are typically passed on to its successor, which conserves them as it reaches out to embrace additional facts.... Thus it is that science... strives always, and through varying theories to save... phenomena while adding to them.... Throughout the apparent flux of changing scientific beliefs, then, there is a solid growth of knowledge. Underlying historical changes of theory, there is, moreover, a constancy of logic and method, which unifies each scientific age with that which preceded it and with that which is yet to follow" (Scheffler, Science and Subjectivity, 1967, p. 9).

The above outlined assessment methodology openly recognizes the disciplinary value of initial empirical abstractions and statistical generalizations in a discipline but further specifies the aim of ongoing empirical investigation as the eventual ordering of these abstractions into a developmental account of the subject matter (concrete description), which in turn leads toward a new level of theoretical understanding (called concrete conception) within which all of the particular and general developmental transformations, situational manifestations, idiosyncratic (or abnormal) aspects of the subject matter are explainable. Concrete concepts (true theories) are veridical statements about the essential determinants of the objects, events, or processes under study.

A detailed analysis of the scientific process "of rising from initially abstract to a concrete" understanding can be found in my article on the psychological subdiscipline of personality, but it is equally applicable to at least four other subdisciplinary areas of psychology that I know of: perception, learning, memory, and motivation.

Summary:

To summarize, as Charles Tolman (1988, 1991) indicated, the disciplinary situation of theoretical indeterminacy addressed by high-profile pundits of pluralism (including Kuhn, Koch, and Gergen) has not proven to be a necessary nor enduring state of affairs (see also Tolman & Lemery, 1990). Instead, resolution of the so-called successor theory problem simply required a new and at that point severely underutilized understanding of the nature of empirical and theoretical levels of science (Ballantyne, 1995).

This approach to assessing the "maturity" of competing positions utilizes the full-complement of both progressive naturalistic emergentist (a.k.a., integrative levels) trends in other disciplines (e.g., see Novikoff, 1945); and Gibson's (1966, 1979) theory of direct perception to emphasize the point that it is the nature of the development of the object under study which is the proper source of the "generative metaphors" detailed by Danziger (1990; 1997). In turn, the assessment methodology also provides a basis for the kinds of "consensus meetings" pointed out to be so necessary by de Groot (1990).

The ongoing task then seems to be that we promote the kinds of departmental and organizational structures and funding opportunities to combine, write down, teach, and apply these relatively novel approaches. In doing so, we will be promoting the adoption in 21st century psychology of the kinds of "large-scale theories" said by Staats (1987) to be indicative of a "unified" psychological discipline.

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