History and Theory of Psychology Course

Paul F. Ballantyne, Ph.D.
pballan@comnet.ca

Aristotelian and Dialectical Logic

Formal logic and Dialectical logic. One source of the traditional (17th-18th century) mechanistic theory of change or development is said to reside in the inadvertent overgeneralization -from argumentative discourse to being- of three deductive maxims (a.k.a., laws) of correct thinking stated implicitly by Aristotle. Somerville (1967) nicely contrasts the Aristotelian view of correct thinking (a.k.a., formal logic) with the 19th century dialectical view of correct thinking (a.k.a., dialectical logic). Although Somerville overstates the case somewhat with respect to Aristotle himself (see Section 1) the overall contrast remains useful with regard to how the Aristotelian maxims where utilized by others. Somerville is simply cautioning us that 'what is often called "Aristotelian logic" should not to be identified with "logic itself" or with "the logic of things" per se' (pp. 42-43).

The Aristotelian maxims (which are simply summarized statements about the necessarily assumed consistency between the nouns or predicates used in the various propositions of a given ontological argument) have come to be known as: (1) Law of Identity (A is A); (2) Law of Noncontradiction (A is not non-A); and (3) Law of Excluded Middle (Any X is either A or non-A). Instances of each are found throughout Aristotle's Metaphysics and Posterior Analytics. In both works, whether Aristotle is stating his own views or arguing against the views of others, one gets the distinct impression that these maxims are intended by him as a guide to consistent and clear discourse about the "subject" (the nouns) being referred to in a given argument. They are, in other words, being presented (primarily) as an analytical aid which might help promote clear and logical discourse about being (nature) rather than bold-faced statements about the nature of being per se.

Having (perhaps) overlooked this somewhat subtle latter distinction, it is understandable why Somerville mistakenly claims that "what Aristotle sees as the most basic characteristic of existence is [its] static self-identity" (p. 45). But this characterization is, in fact, more indicative of Plato's absolutized ontological dualism and the equally absolutized materialist monism of 17th through 18th century mechanical views on nature than of Aristotle. His assumed relational monist position (regarding "matter and form") had some flaws (on the form end of that relationship) but it also allowed Aristotle to remain far more interested in understanding the dynamic aspects of physical matter or observable worldly events, the origin of animal species, and even with coming up with a relational or near-functional account of psychological processes than Plato. So, with some notable qualifications -specifically the remaining idealist aspects of his theory of "forms" and his own notion of empirical "lawfulness" as that which is exceptionless- it is not entirely fair to tar Aristotle with the same "staticness" brush as Plato or later more mechanistic thinkers (Lewin, 1931; Randall, 1960; Lloyd, 1970; Balme, 1975; Tolman, 1983b, 1991d, 1994b).

With specific regard to Somerville's encapsulation of the three Aristotelian maxims of deductive logical discourse as such, however, I believe he does a slightly better job:

"[Aristotle's] three laws really make the same [discursive] point from three different angles; positively, by saying that a thing can be only what it is; negatively, by saying that a thing cannot be what it is not; and dichotomously, by saying that there are only two alternatives -to be A or not to be A- and they are mutually exclusive" (Somerville, 1967, p. 45).

This is all made fairly evident by Aristotle in Book IV of the Metaphysics (especially Parts 3-6) where his admitted run-on argument against the loose use of logic by his predecessors finally comes to its seemingly definitive terminus. In Part 3, Aristotle starts out by counseling us to avoid any overzealous "dialectical objections" to his implied maxims: "For it is impossible for any one to believe the same thing to be and not to be, as some think Heraclitus says" (emphasis added). After a bit of repetition in Part 4, he then proceeds to expose the extreme "doctrine of Protagoras" (that all opinions are true) as inherently self-refuting (Part 5). Finally, it is also in Part 5 that the sophistication of Aristotle's ancient viewpoint (on nature) is made manifest. Here, he takes both Anaxagoras and Democritus (who were already in the main dynamic thinkers) to task for the remaining static aspects of their views and even begins adopting a notably reconciliatory tone toward views which best match up with Heraclitus (who emphasized contradiction and developmental transformation in nature).

.... To those, then, whose belief rests on these grounds, we shall say that in a sense they speak rightly and in a sense they err. For 'that which is' has two meanings, so that in some sense a thing can come to be out of that which is not, while in some sense it cannot, and the same thing can at the same time be in being and not in being -but not in the same respect. For the same thing can be potentially at the same time two contraries, but it cannot actually... (Metaphysics, Book IV, Part 5).

To put this important point a little more clearly than Aristotle did is rather crucial because it has been all too often misunderstood or overlooked. So I'll say it again. In Part 3-6 of Book IV of the Metaphysics, Aristotle is indicating to us that to accept his three maxims of Identity, Noncontradiction and Excluded Middle (for discourse) does not thereby entitle us to automatically overgeneralize them to all cases or "respects" of "being" (nature). His logical maxims do not, in other words, excuse us from recognizing the existence of "potential" or "actual" internal contradictions which arise out of (or as a result of) changing or developing worldly events. To do so would be to return to the metaphysically assumed unchanging (static) universe of Plato or to the logical paradoxes of Zeno (regarding the 'lack' of motion of the arrow through space, etc.). Aristotle was attempting to back off from all such radicalized positions (be they from followers of Heraclitus, Protagoras, or whomever).

As "principles" (or rules) that govern the use of language in such ontological arguments, Aristotle's maxims are as valid and important today as they ever were. They were also, however, but one of the varied analytical tools (including observation and his theory of four causes) that Aristotle utilized to avoid adopting unreasonable, absolutized, or otherwise "extreme" arguments. Regardless of which of his works you look at, "change" in the physical (material) world or in living bodies is depicted as "always" directed toward "what is opposite or intermediate" (e.g., see De Anima, Book II, Part 4). Aristotle, therefore, seems to have recognized the limitations of his maxims with regard to specific cases or instances of dynamic or developing "being" but others, alas, did not.

Anyway, in contrast to the 'mechanical world view' (wherever it may be found) materialist dialectics holds that the basic rules of correct thinking should reflect a universe not in which the static and changeless is at the core (e.g., Plato; Aristotle's theory of forms; and 17th-18th century mechanistic accounts) but in which change and development is at the core.

The dialectical maxims of correct thinking, which subsume not only the "three" deductive Aristotelian maxims of clear discourse but also his more inductive theory of "four" causes, are as follows: (1) Law of Unity and Struggle of Opposites: Every object or process develops into something else, not only because it is affected by some external force but also because the very components out of which it is made force changes (change is built-in to its existence); (2) Law of Transition from Quantitative to Qualitative Change: Development cannot take place without discontinuity; and (3) Law of Negation: Every new stage, while synthesizing in itself the progressive trend of previous stages, contains within itself the preconditions for further development (see Cornforth, 1952). In brief, the first dialectical law says that every particular thing has a history as well as an end; the second, that the history is qualitative as well as quantitative; the third, that this kind of history does not stop (Somerville, 1967, p. 67).

These "dialectical" laws are presented as conclusions arrived at on the basis of the factual evidence rather than as a priori "principles." Even though these analytically derived dialectical dynamics are regarded as universal (found in everything), it is not claimed that the specific empirical or theoretical laws of each particular level of reality (physical, chemical, biological, psychological, etc.) can be deduced from them. While dialectical logic in its function as a tool of analysis provides broad methodological guidelines it "does not obviate the necessity of finding, in each new case, the specific cause, the concrete pattern of change" (Somerville, 1967, p. 74). Materialist dialectics therefore provides a strategy of approach to the empirical investigation of phenomena rather than a detached (abstract) catalogue of logical contradictions (e.g., cause/effect, necessity/chance, possibility/reality, essence/appearance) to seek. What the specific objective contradictions of particular (concrete) objects (or even general levels of nature) are, and how these become resolved by way of development (e.g., mechanical, phylogenetic, ontogenetic, or sociohistorical change), constitute the very questions for empirical scientists in the various fields of knowledge to discover, justify, and ultimately explain theoretically (After Konstantinov, 1974, p. 146).

References

Aristotle Selected extracts from Book IV, Parts 3-6 of Aristotle's Metaphysics.

Balme, D.M. (1975). Aristotle's use of differentiae in zoology. In J. Barnes, M. Schofield, & R. Sorabji (Eds.). Articles on Aristotle, Vol. 1 Science. London: Duckworth.Parts 3-6

Cornforth, M. (1952). Dialecticial Materialism: An introductory course. [Vol. 1: Materialism and the Dialectical Method.] London: Lawrence & Wishart.

Konstantinov, F.V. (1974). The Fundamentals of Marxist Leninist Philosophy. Moscow: Progress publishers.

Lewin, K. (1931). The conflict between Aristotelian and Galileian modes of thought in contemporary psychology. J. of Genetic Psychology, 5, 141-177.

Lloyd, G.E.R. (1970). Early Greek Science: Thales to Aristotle. London: Chatto & Windus.

Randall, J.H. (1960). Aristotle. New York, Columbia University Press.

Somerville, J. (1967/1983). Chapter 1: "The Nature of Reality: Dialectical Materialism" (pp. 3-39); Chapter 2: The Nature of Thought: Logic and Dialectics (pp. 41-77). In The Philosophy of Marxism: An Exposition. Minneapolis: Marxist Educational Press.

Tolman, C.W. (1983b). Further comments on the meaning of dialectic. Human Development, 26, 320-324.

Tolman, C.W. (1991d). For a more adequate concept of development with help from Aristotle and Marx. In P. van Geert & L.P. Mos (Eds.), Annals of Theoretical Psychology, 7, 349-356. New York: Plenum
Publishing Co.

Tolman, C.W. (1994b). What is Living and What is Dead in Aristotle's Psychology? Theory & Psychology, 4, 433-446. (Review of KENNETH RANKTN The Recovery of the Soul: An Aristotelian Essay on Self-fulfillment. 1991; and DANIEL N. ROBINSON, Aristotle’s Psychology. 1989).

Posted: [May, 2003; Last Update: March, 2008]