Concrete Concept Of Personality

The task of establishing theoretical unification, or integration, within a psychological area is one of determining relative superiority among conflicting accounts. As many recent articles have shown, however, traditional assessment criteria (novelty, quantifiability, accuracy, parsimony, replicability) do not provide such integration (Staats, 1987; Wertheimer, 1988; Groot, 1990).

J.R. Royce (1988) suggested that the traditional criteria had to do with the context of justification and that the solution to the problem of indeterminacy would come from obtaining "the same kind of deep and penetrating analyses of the discovery aspect" of our science (p. 63). That is, we must outline the careers of psychological positions as they advance from weak to strong. Neither the application of a monolithic unifying principle (e.g., logical or uninomic positivism) nor the collection of more data will be helpful (Tolman & Lemery, 1990). The required antidote is to outline the successive types of positions in each area and evaluate their correspondence to aspects of the developmental processes under study.

This chapter demonstrates how various 20^th century positions on personality fit into a hierarchy of empirical and theoretical maturity based on combined outlines of scientific discourse from Scheffler (1967/1982), Davydov (1984) and Ilyenkov (1982). Although such match-ups are never perfect, the utility of this combined approach shows promise.

In his book Science and Subjectivity, Israel Scheffler (1967/1982) advanced a steadfastly objectivist, but non-positivist, account of the standard view of science. According to the standard view, facts provide the empirical data which form observational laws. These are, in turn, related and explained by theoretical laws.

The challenge for psychologists has been how to reconcile this standard view with the actual state of the science. How are the various empirical and theoretical positions in psychology to be related and evaluated? To relate is to note the succession of positions [p. 152] in a given area (e.g., personality); to evaluate is to assess the questions addressed by each position, as well as their correspondence with various aspects of the area.

Table 1 shows the complementary terms used by Scheffler, Davydov, and Ilyenkov to describe levels of discursive maturity. Scheffler's (1967/1982) distinction between the empirical and theoretical levels of science is effectively equivalent to Davydov's (1984) distinction between abstract and substantial generalization and Ilyenkov's (1982) distinction between initial abstraction, initial generalization, and concrete conception. The category of concrete description has been added to expand Scheffler's empirical level.

Table 1. Methodology For Assessing The Maturity Of Empirical And Theoretical Positions

Scheffler	Davydov	Ilyenkov
Theoretical	Substantial General	Concrete Conception (Explanation)
Empirical		Concrete Description
	Abstract General	Initial Generalization
		Initial Abstraction

Scheffler stated his aim as the "reinterpretation and defense of… objectivity" (1967/1982, p. vii). He stressed that his "elaboration of the standard view [was] intended as a basis for discussion" (p. viii). But there is a problem in Scheffler's two-tiered view of science: It assumes that all empirical investigation is concrete (because it deals with immediate experience), whereas all theory (because it goes beyond immediate experience) is abstract. Both Davydov and Ilyenkov argue that such a view is oversimplified. The task of empirical research, they suggest, is to catalog and classify various aspects of an area. These empirical categories (whether they are specific or general) may be either abstract (i.e., reveal superficial aspects) or concrete (reveal essential or necessary interrelations). Truly theoretical thinking, however, is always concrete because it is concerned with reconstructing the general developmental transformations of the subject matter (Ilyenkov, 1982, p. 31; Davydov, 1984, pp. 14-15).

For example, when presented with two equal sized cubes of metal, some of their different empirical features, like color, weight and magnetism, may be useful starting points. Other superficial aspects such as luster may not be useful. Generalized empirical information about their respective malleability, electrical conductivity and corrosiveness can be obtained by further manipulation. Empirical descriptive analysis of their crystalline structures reveals the origin of functional aspects like stiffness and thermal expansion. However, knowledge of the genesis of such metals (e.g., in a certain size star, meteor, blast furnace, or atomic reactor) represents a still higher, developmental form of generalization. [p. 153]

For Davydov and Ilyenkov, the theory is this higher, concrete, form of generalization. Scheffler (1967/1982), however, tended to use the term to refer to empirical generalization (initial or abstract generalization in Ilyenkov and Davydov's terms). This left his outline vulnerable to anti-objectivism which trades on the indeterminacy of abstract empirical investigations.

In Table 1, therefore, Scheffler's empirical level has been stretched to include three stages (initial abstraction, initial generalization and concrete description). This conforms to the view shared by Davydov and Ilyenkov that most empirical research is abstract (e.g., artificial experimental milieus, generalized correlations among surface features), while only some of it is concrete (e.g., non-obtrusive observation, careful longitudinal studies). Scheffler's notion of the cumulative nature of theoretical conceptions, however, is preserved in the resulting four-tiered view of science.

This understanding of scientific discourse can be used to assess 20^th century positions on personality (see Table 2).

Early investigation involves initial abstractions at the empirical level. That is, particular aspects or qualities of a phenomenon are selected as important for study. The operational definitions of motivation (hunger, thirst, pain, and sex) are examples of such initial abstractions (Brown, 1979). At this early stage of investigation, questions about what aspects of a phenomenon to study for a particular purpose are favored over the hunt for a crystallized definition of the whole phenomenon.

In the 1920s and early 1930s, personality researchers often published in the Journal of Applied Psychology (Parker, 1991). The concern was to establish the advantages of empirical study of personality over the former phrenological and graphology traditions (e.g., Cleeton, 1924). These psychologists, while studying what were later to be called traits, were "not particularly interested in developing personality theory" (Endler & Parker, 1992, p. 179).

This emphasis of the part at the expense of the whole indicates the immaturity of an early investigation. Hence, in 1938, Henry Murray characterized the area as "still in its diaper enjoying random movements" (p. 21). The advent of disciplinary self-analysis [p. 154] regarding the validity of empirical procedures and clinical tests marked the transition to a more standardized approach (e.g., Landis & Katz, 1934; Hertz, 1935).

This stage involves the formation of categories and classification of types thought to apply to various aspects of the phenomena (or segments of the population) under study. Two logically contradictory but empirically supportable classes of categories were abstracted from the personality area. Trait categories included neuroticism, extroversion, openness, agreeableness, and conscientiousness. Situationist categories included observational and vicarious environmental influences (Bandura, 1973; Mischel, 1973).

Although Allport and Vernon (1930) recognized the need to situate the trait view within the broader context of personality such concerns were subsequently dropped. Trait theory's tendency toward "methodolatry," a shift of concern away from elaborating some causal process toward concern over statistical outcome (Danziger, 1990, pp. 111-112; Bakan, 1967, pp. 158-159), is a symptom of its abstractness.

In the purified trait approach, the question of whether traits exist as anything more than empirical convenience was replaced with the question of how many traits are produced by which statistical method (i.e., Cattell versus Eysenck versus McCrae and Costa). For instance, Digman (1990) lists the similar factors obtained by empirical studies between the years 1949-1986 while taking the ontological status of personality traits completely for granted.

Although pure trait and situationist positions are rapidly becoming historical curiosities (Kendrick & Funder, 1988), the continuous and discontinuous aspects of personality are often framed in terms of exclusive alternatives. Kagan (1988) argues that there are either (A) "static entities" which don't change (essences which do not vary when the organism or context does vary) or (B) "discontinuous constructs" which vary across contexts (pp. 617-619). A widely used introductory text by Atkinson, Atkinson, Smith, & Bem (1990) describes the same issue as the "consistency paradox" (pp. 543). Despite such logical difficulties, there has developed a distinct preference for eclectic and longitudinal studies.

Concrete descriptive research focuses on the relations between the various classifications (e.g., traits, environment, socio-historical events). Temporal relations between categories are also investigated to obtain a descriptive outline of the area. In the mid-1970s, the interactionist approach attempted such an outline.

The interactionist argues that personality is not just a ripening of genetic traits, nor just the effect of varied situations but both (Bowers, 1973; Pervin, 1977). The most recent proponents distinguish between mechanistic and dynamic interactionism. Endler and Parker (1992), for instance, point out that the empirical methods used by mechanistic interactionism (ANOVA and the IV-DV model) were not suited for developmental analysis. They suggest replacing those empirical tools with the statistical technique of path analysis and programs such as LISREL which allow bidirectional causal models to [p. 155] be tested (see Bynner & Romney, 1985).

While this is an interesting move, dynamic interactionist are still focusing on correlations among prerequisites of personality, not aspects of personality itself. Just as the details of personality are not found in genes (the biological prerequisites for the personality), nor in any passive or active adaptation to an environment (the biological and social conditions for the individual), they are also not found in the correlations between those two abstractions.

The interactionist position, while claiming a role for heredity and for environment, fails to account for the interaction itself, i.e., human society. Societal events (e.g., war, economic depression, changing [social] norms) are considered as external 'factors' that correlate with personality traits. A static view of development as the result of outside factors on stable elements is assumed.

Dialectical logic has been missing from interactionist views (e.g., Magnusson, 1990). In contrast to the supplementary linear empirical tools urged by interactionists, dialectical logic is a theoretical tool (Ilyenkov, 1977). In the present case, it helps to distinguish between the logical contradiction of linguistic categories (e.g., continuity versus discontinuity) and the objective contradictions of personality development (transformation of a biological individual into a societal personality).

Concrete concepts involve the revelation of "necessary interconnections" among the abstractable properties of the subject matter (Tolman, 1991, p. 160; see also Bakhurst, 1991). These necessary interconnections are generally revealed by a developmental account of the phenomenon.

An example of personality theory which approaches this explanatory stage, is A. N. Leontiev's (1978) theory of Activity. It explicitly uses a dialectical materialist analysis and is an extension of the better known Vygotskian tradition (Tolman, 1983; Wertsch, 1986). According to Leontiev, personality must be understood in terms of its development in societal relations from the initially biological and social individual. The process is one of the individual's active appropriation of culture. In other words, the becoming of personality must be studied, as opposed only to its prerequisites.

Contrary to trait theory, one is not born a personality but rather a biological individual. Also contrary to situationist theory, the basis is biological individuality (i.e., the infant's characteristic level of physiological activeness, attention span, general mood). Personality develops through the active internalization of culture under societal influences.

This must be distinguished from interactionist theory (where genes and environment "meet" culture). The child's inauguration into societal practices is conceived not simply as the origin of particular beliefs, desires, hopes, intentions and so on, but as the source of the child's very capacity to believe, to desire, and so on (Bakhurst, 1991, p. 78). The analytical tools used by the Activity approach to investigate how biologically given processes are transformed into societal processes (joint action, appropriation, etc.) are outlined in Tolman (1988).

According to Leontiev (1978), the infant as an active biological individual is guided [p. 156] by, and also guides, the [nurturing] activity of the primary care giver (joint action). This relationship is an aspect of [every part of] the infant's life (feeding, clothing, excretion, etc.). Such reciprocal guidance is always relative to the biological and experiential development of the child. The way such ontogenetic development proceeds is to be found in the relation between what the child can do by itself and what it can do with the help of others (see Vygotsky, 1978, pp. 84-91, on the zone of proximal development).

The quality of the joint action is important. Western research on the differences between authoritative, authoritarian, indulgent, and neglecting parenting demonstrated this point (see Maccoby and Martin, 1983). Despite its factorial methods, the research of Scarr and McCartney (1983) on evocative interaction (where the child seeks out new societal relations) confirms Leontiev's theory.

Although this chapter focused on modern views of personality, the same assessment methodology applies to other core areas of psychology. This methodology recognizes the historical value of initial abstractions on the empirical level, but specifies the aim of scientific discourse as the eventual concretization of the abstract through the attainment of concrete generalization on the theoretical-explanatory level. By elaborating the levels of scientific discourse more fully, this methodology reveals the relative maturities of empirical and theoretical positions in psychology, making choices and integrations among such positions attainable in principle.

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Concrete Conception	Activity Approach to Personality
Concrete Description	Interactionist Approach
Initial Generalization	Trait and Situationist Approaches
Initial Abstraction	Applied Empirical Forays

Ballantyne, P. F. (1995). From Initial Abstractions To A Concrete Concept Of Personality. In I. Lubek, et al. (Eds.). Recent Trends in Theoretical Psychology. Vol. 4, pp. 151-157. New York: Springer.

From Initial Abstractions To A Concrete Concept Of Personality