*Presented at the International Society for the History of Behavioral and Social Sciences (Cheiron). Montreal, Quebec, Canada, June 2-5, 1994.

Abstract

Selective views on Lewes: From 'crowning discovery' to unimportant.

"On the whole it will perhaps be just to credit Lewes with the doctrine of the dependence of the Human Mind upon the Social Medium as his single and crowning discovery. He did in his life much meritorious work, but has left little that can as a whole survive" (Read, 1881, p. 498).

"One could only wish that he had written a briefer statement….The inner consistency and force of his system would then have appeared to better advantage, and Lewes would probably have exerted a greater influence…" (Warren, 1921, p. 138).

"No one would claim that Lewes added anything of permanent value to philosophical thought" (Ockenden, 1940, p. 78).

"The other important author of evolutionary psychology at this time was George Henry Lewes (1817-1878). His influence, however, has not been nearly so great as Herbert Spencer's, and we can afford to pass him by" (Boring, 1950, p. 244).

OVERVIEW OF HISTORICAL COVERAGE

Lewes figured prominently in T.H. Ribot's late-19^th century text on English psychology. Similarly, the reviews of GHL's psychological works, in early volumes of Mind, concentrate on his battle against Automaton and Reflex theory. In particular, Lewes was recognized as the first to suggest the distinctly social origin of human psychological processes.

Early 20^th century reviews by Ruckmick, Brett, and Warren discuss GHL's posthumous book on psychological methodology. In those reviews Lewes was recognized as being the first to consistently apply the term 'function' in its modern psychological usage. The breadth of his psychological methodology was also recognize. In other words, Lewes had provided a sound assessment of the comparative, experimental and introspective methods of the period.

Similarly, C.L. Morgan (1923) explicitly based the concept of emergent evolution on GHL's work. Emergent evolution, probably the best account of the basis for expecting to find different grades of mentality across species, was put forward against the reductive form of ontology which was exerting a disruptive influence on early 20^th century psychology. The subsequent underestimation of Lewes is due to the same disciplinary influences and limitations which governed the historical misrepresentation of Morgan's canon.

Boring (1929), as one of the powerful disciplinary players of the period, began a long-lasting policy of exclusion of Lewes from the history of psychology. It was first suggested here that Lewes could be overlooked because he was not as influential as Spencer. Lewes was subsequently missing from all of the well-known general histories of psychology (e.g., Heidbreder; Flugel; Murphy; R.I. Watson).

In the 1960s, this trend was briefly defied by individuals such as Hearnshaw, and Young, who were writing specialist histories. Unfortunately, the trend itself was not abated. It was only in the late-1980s that Lewes made a brief reappearance in general disciplinary histories written by D.N. Robinson and David Murray. Future texts covering the development of scientific psychology should not underestimate the contemporaneous and ongoing theoretical contributions of G.H. Lewes.

As Lewes is not well covered in contemporary history of psychology texts, we will first address the occasional, rather naive, claims about the origin of his lack of influence in British psychology. The original reviews of his major works will then serve to demonstrate the challenging nature and modern methodological flavor of his views. The historical context and personal biases of each of the reviewers (both British and American) will also be highlighted.

LACK OF INFLUENCE IN BRITISH PSYCHOLOGY

In the first half of the 19th century, British thought was dominated by issues of social reform. During this period, Lewes and his future common-law spouse Mary Ann Evans (novelist George Eliot) were active in literary and political circles through their work at, or contributions to, journals such as: Westminster Review, Contemporary Review, British and Foreign Review, Nineteenth Century and The Leader. In these journals Lewes favorably reviewed works by Dickens, Comte, and Darwin.

After 1895, however, the task of reconciling evolutionary science with religious doctrine dominated British thought (see Randall, 1965). For example, the Cambridge based Metaphysical Society was established in 1869 to address the conflict between religion and Victorian science (see Brown, 1973). Being both antitheistic and antireductionist, Lewes did not fit neatly into the general course of intellectual divides between 1859 and 1879. As Kaminsky (1952) points out, Lewes avoids the positivist position (Comte, Mill, Spencer) without joining the equally abstract metaphysical reactions to it (W. Hamilton, Cardinal Newman, T.H. Green). His Problems of Life and Mind was dedicated to the "transformation of Metaphysics by… the Method of Science" (1873, p. 4).

The fact that Lewes died before the last two volumes of his works were published has occasionally been said to have decreased his immediate influence in psychology. I suggest this is plausible only when considered in combination with other more important factors. T.H. Green's posthumously published Prolegomena to Ethics (1883), for instance was highly influential. That book was also unfinished when the author died.

It is more likely that the conservative climate in which GHL's psychological works were published was the overwhelming reason for its lack of immediate influence. This intellectual climate is nicely encapsulated by Hearnshaw (1964):

"In 1874 for the first time for a generation a Conservative Government was returned to power with an assured majority, and the tide of liberalism, [in religion, art and philosophy] which had dominated…since the Reform Bill [1832], turned. In the same year the first translation of Hegel appeared in English (Hegel's Logic, tr. W. Wallace) and the Oxford philosopher T.H. Green issued his summons: 'Close your Mill and your Spencer, and turn to Kant and Hegel'… [Quoting Metz:]… 'the opening of the door to the German invasion was not prompted by purely philosophical interests, but rather by the desire to…[shore up] orthodox theology… against Agnosticism, Naturalism, religious indifference and open unbelief'" (Hearnshaw, 1964, p. 126).

Similarly, GHL's lack of formal training and academic office was not the sole reason for his lack of immediate influence. Spencer also held no degree and no office. Darwin and Galton both held Cambridge degrees, but their income was made outside the academic establishment. Given this combination of factors, one can see how a decidedly unorthodox figure such as Lewes did not fit neatly into the era (see Ashton, 1991 for a detailed biographical account). Support for this combined-cause interpretation is also found in the early reviews of his work.

LATE 19th CENTURY REVIEWS

T.H. Ribot in English Psychology (1874) considered GHL important enough to tease out the psychological aspects from his earlier works including Physiology of Common Life (1859-60) and History of Philosophy (1845-46). The review was favorable in tone but it also pointed out that "Mr. Lewes's" views "differ upon more than one point from received opinions" (1874, p. 291).

Ribot highlighted GHL's theory of consciousness because it suggests that the seat of sensation and consciousness is not limited to the brain. Whereas Flourens (1824) had maintained that the animal deprived of its brain loses all sensation, Lewes extended what he called "sentience" to the reflex level and protested against the correlation of mind and brain. His views were derived from careful consideration of physiological evidence by Robert Whytt (1714-1766), Eduard Pfluger (1829-1910), and Friedrich Goltz (1834-1902). The debate over the seat of sensation came to be labeled by James (1890) as the Pfluger-Lotze controversy.

Moving beyond the works available to Ribot's (1874) review, two quotes from Lewes on this issue are important to note. First of all, Lewes was the only one to surmount existing overstatements about the 'seat of sensation' by explicitly proposing a viable (experimentally supportable) categorical distinction:

"Much of the obscurity arises from not distinguishing between Sentience, the activity of the neuro-muscular system, and Consciousness (in the special sense of Reflection), the particular Mode of Sentience" (Lewes, 1879, Sect. 12).

Freidrich Leopold Goltz left; Eduard F.W. Pfluger (1829-1910) right.

Secondly, this distinction between sentience and consciousness was guided by GHL's intimate knowledge of the available empirical evidence. For instance, in his Physical Basis of the Mind, he writes:

"Goltz removed the brain of a frog, which he then held under water, gently pressing the body so as to drive the air out of its lungs; the body being then heavier than the water sank to the bottom, where it remained motionless. He repeated this procedure with another frog, not brainless but blinded. This one sank also, but in a few minutes rose to the surface to breathe. This difference naturally suggest that the brainless frog was insensible of the condition which in the other caused a movement of relief. The one felt impending suffocation, the other felt nothing. Such was the interpretation of a German friend in whose presence I repeated the experiment. But I had been instructed by Goltz, and bade my friend wait awhile. He did so, and saw the brainless frog slowly rise to the surface and breathe there like his blinded companion. So that the only difference observable was in the lessened sensibility of the brainless frog" (Lewes, 1877, pp. 523-524).

The first editor of Mind, Croom Robertson (a prominent member of the Metaphysical Society) reviewed GHL's Physical Basis in the third volume of Mind (1878). In that book, Lewes utilizes the concept of 'selective adaptation of action' to challenge the Animal Automaton doctrine of T.H. Huxley (1874). GHL's list of antitheses to points made by Huxley, argued against the way Huxley's language might be misused by others (i.e., idols of the marketplace).

"Descartes says that animals are sensitive automata. Professor Huxley says that other animals and men are sensitive and conscious automata; so that misleading as the language… is, … we do them great injustice if we suppose them to have overlooked the point of difference between organisms and machines" (Lewes, 1877, p. 439).

The language being used by Lewes (i.e., sentience and consciousness) is clearly more careful than that of Descartes or Huxley. Similarly the non-exclusionary logic of GHL's argument (though not the labels) was later used implicitly by James (1890) against the Austrian anatomist Theodor Meynert (1833-1892). Meynert's scheme "makes the lower centers too machine-like and the hemispheres not… machine-like enough…" (James, 1890, p. 27).

Despite their theoretical strengths, Carveth Read's (1881) reception of GHL's posthumously published works was somewhat cold. Although Read's review acknowledged GHL's insight into the social nature of psychological processes, the important distinction between animal functions and human psychological faculties was completely overlooked. Similarly, GHL's distinction between the logical of feelings (in animals and infants) and the logic of signs (in human language) -as well as GHL's elaborations on their significance for ethical issues (fear of consequences vs. true social conscience)- remained unappreciated in the review. Read's own eventual book on ethics, Natural and Social Morals (1909), also contained more on Spencer and Henry Sidgwich than on Lewes.

Perhaps we should forgive Read for the shortcomings of his review. It is, after all, very difficult to evaluate the implications of a work before they have occurred or before such alternative views have become necessary. Neither behaviorism nor so-called functional psychology proper, for instance, had yet occurred. Similarly, it was only in the 1920s and 30s that C.L. Morgan outlined the doctrine of "emergent" evolution and its implications for psychology (1923; 1933).

EARLY 20TH CENTURY COVERAGE

Lewes received some important early 20th century recognition for the theoretical distinctions he made. For instance, Christian Ruckmick (1913) -an unorthodox figure in his own right- named Lewes as the originator of the distinction between faculty and function. This recognition is important because Lewes (1879) uses this distinction for no less than his definition of psychology:

"Psychology is the analysis and classification of the sentient functions and faculties, revealed to observation and induction, completed by the reduction of them to their conditions of existence, biological and sociological" (Lewes, 1879, Sect. 4).

Functions "stand for the native endowment of the organ, and faculty for its acquired variation of activity" (Lewes, 1879, Sect. 16). For Lewes some of these functions are: instincts, emotions, sensations and perceptions. Some of the faculties (modes of employment of functions) include language, thought, moral sense, and intelligence. He was also careful to stress that it is through distinctly social relations that these higher powers of the mind are developed:

"The conspicuous mental differences between a Goethe and a Carib cannot be assigned to differences in their organisms and functions but solely to their developed faculties" (Lewes, 1879, Sect. 15).

A second early 20th century recognition GHL's views is contained in Howard Warren's book on association psychology (1921). The chapter called "Evolutionary Association" pointed out that Spencer and Lewes belong to a later generation in thought than Bain because they had assimilated the notion of evolution before undertaking their analysis of mental phenomena" (Warren, 1921, p. 120).

Warren also outlines the important methodological difference between Spencer and Lewes. Spencer's analysis proceeds according to the traditional association method. That is, higher manifestations of mind are regarded as unions, associations, or relations of lower forms; very much as in Hartley and the Mills. Although, with Spencer, the law of frequency or habit acquires a phylogenetic as well as an ontogenetic interpretation, the main problem remains the same --to "account for…higher complexities according to the principle of association" (Warren, p. 134). In contrast, GHL's conception of the importance of social phenomena for mental science is a departure from the traditional associationist method and is traceable to the influence of Comte.

That is, while Lewes agrees with Spencer in laying special stress on physiology and biological evolution as a basis for psychological phenomena, he "does not go to Spencer's length of regarding the biological standpoint as furnishing the only scientific element in psychology" (Warren, p. 140). This fundamental methodological difference is apparent in GHL's use of the concept of "social evolution" (Sect. 59) with respect to the origin of human faculties:

"Nay many sentiments and conceptions are not possible even to human beings until social evolution has brought them in its train. So far from their being innate, they are utterly unknown to the vast majority of mankind" (Lewes, 1879, Sect. 59).

Warren summed up his views on Lewes by making direct reference to the "inner consistency and force" of GHL's posthumous volumes (p. 138).

George Sidney Brett (1921) also made direct and clearly favorable reference to GHL's 1879 book:

"To the problem of method George Henry Lewes contributed a whole book…it sums up the situation before 1879, and expresses a definite standpoint and programme" (Brett, 1921, Vol. 3, p. 220; also see Peters, 1965, p. 667).

Brett indicates that it was the conservative intellectual setting in which GHL's (1879) views were proposed, rather than any internal inconsistency or lack of theoretical merit, that were at fault for their immediate lack of influence. He talks of a slowing of progress in British psychology which "culminated" in James Ward's article on psychology for the Encyclopaedia Britannica (1886).

As indicated above, the articles by T.H. Green (1877-81) also rejected many of the insights of both Spencer and Lewes. Green's imported neo-Hegelian philosophy was openly antagonistic to the prevailing empirical/physiological psychology of the era. Ward's views, while more friendly to experimental investigation, were also concerned with defending religion against 'Huxlean naturalism' (see Ward, 1899/1912, 1915).

Ironically, Lewes had stressed the social origins of psychological processes for the expressed purpose of providing the burgeoning discipline of psychology with a route away from both spiritualism (where Ward ended up) and away from reductive materialism (to which Green was so adverse).

"The conditions of existence are not only biological but also socio-logical studies. A serious investigation of these will serve to remove most if not all of the difficulties which make men cling to the spiritualist hypothesis, because they are profoundly impressed with the inadequacy of the materialist hypothesis" (Lewes, 1879, Sect. 61).

THE SLIP INTO OBSCURITY

Although early 20th century sources provided some coverage of GHL's work, this pattern of inclusion did not last. Boring's suggestion that "we can afford to pass [Lewes] by" first appeared in the 1929 edition of his History of Experimental Psychology (p. 234) and was repeated in the 1950 edition. This assessment then took hold with a vengeance. None of the history and system texts published during the 30s (e.g., Woodworth, 1931; Flugel, 1933; Heidbreder, 1933) included any coverage of poor old Lewes.

Boring's 1950 edition also contains a more serious and unwarranted claim that Lewes "reduced psychology to biology and sociology" (p. 634). This claim is certainly the most unfair of the two which Boring made because in fact, GHL's views were highly antireductive (in either direction). The latter claim may also betray some of Boring's own motives for skipping so lightly over the ongoing disciplinary implications of GHL's actual contributions. For up to 1950, experimental psychology had certainly not adopted the wider unit of psychological analysis so clearly advocate by the following two quotations from Lewes:

"Unless illuminated by a study of the organism as a whole, investigation of nerve-cells will throw no more light on Psychology than investigating the molecular structure of iron rails will explain the Railway Station" (Lewes, 1879, Sect. 87).

"It is therefore to History and the observation of man in social relations that we must look for data which may supplement those of Introspection and Physiology. The conditions of existence of mental phenomena are not only biological but also sociological studies (Lewes, 1879, Sect. 60).

In other words, although this broad view of psychological subject matter had occasionally been utilized by James (1890) and by other open-minded thinkers (e.g., Dewey, C.L. Morgan, and Gordon Allport) it was decidedly the exception to the rule in psychology (both before 1950 and for many years to come).

RECENT COVERAGE

Consistent with the Boring tradition of exclusion, Lewes is conspicuously absent from Klein's (1970) text The History of Scientific Psychology -which was ironically subtitled: "Origins and Philosophical Backgrounds." Some sources even persist in portraying "functional" psychology as an American invention -a view consistent with Boring's (1929) description of an American revolt against continental psychologists. Even Hilgard's Psychology in America (1987) which rightly describes functionalism as a "general orientation [that] received a name" (p. 83), and which provides biographies on Lotze, Bain, Ward, and Titchener does not even mention Lewes.

Exceptions to this policy of exclusion, however, include Hearnshaw (1964); Young (1968, 1970); Robinson (1978, 1981) and Murray (1988). Hearnshaw (1964) although defying the Boring tradition suggests that GHL's physiological investigations were "amateur" (p. 49) and dated more rapidly than the theoretical aspects of his work (see also Danziger, 1982, p. 123). Having read the full text of his Physical Basis from the perspective of my modern neuropsychological training at the University of Victoria, however, I can not concur with Hearnshaw's assessment.

In any case, these Amero-centric and academically biased attitudes toward Lewes, do not change the fact that much of what functional psychology would later become was already present in his work. Add to this the argument that his explicit attempts at establishing a non-reductive methodology are more progressive than anything that Angell or Carr ever produced and we see just one of the reasons to include his views in our historical account of the discipline's early years.

The best recent coverage of Lewes has been provided by D.N. Robinson (1981) where GHL's views are appropriately included in a chapter called "From systems to specialties the crucial half-century (1870-1920)." Lewes, Robinson writes, was "among the 19th century thinkers who expected psychology to be a… science but who rejected the tidy 'isms' promoted by their contemporaries' (1981, p. 374).

By way of elaboration, Robinson points out that just as Lewes was positivist without being Comtean, he was also a Darwinist without being Darwinian. This is what allows the theoretical aspects of GHL's (1879) text on method to "avert datedness" (Robinson, 1978, p. 114). For example, whereas Spencer's texts lean toward what was later to be called 'Social Darwinism' and sociobiology, GHL's text averted those pitfalls by virtue of a clearer understanding of the social origin of the subject matter under study.

"While the mental functions are a function of the individual organism, the product, Mind, is more than an individual product. Like its great instrument, Language, it is at once individual and social. Each man speaks in virtue of the functions of vocal expression, but also in virtue of the social need of communication…. The words spoken are not his creation, yet he, too must appropriate them… [since] he has a similar vocal function, …he can reproduce… their novel combinations of speech; and because he has similar experiences he can understand their novel combinations of thought…" (Lewes, 1879, Sect. 118).

"Extending our researches over various races and epochs, we come upon seeming contradictions to… uniformities…. And, since men differ more in their social relations than in their physiological relations, it is in the former that we should first seek the explanation of intellectual and moral differences… It is here also we must seek for many uniformities" (Lewes, 1879, Sect. 120-121).

Finally, David Murray (1988) in a chapter on the "British Tradition 1800-1879" also includes Lewes. He provides a Table which shows visually, the temporal relations of the Scottish school (Reid, Bain) and the London theorists (Bentham, Mill) to the psychophysiologists (Laycock, Carpenter, Lewes). Although this table is helpful, GHL's views could use more elaboration.

CONCLUSION

G.H. Lewes was an important part of an ongoing, unbroken interdisciplinary discourse regarding the continuities and discontinuities of psychological subject matter. Even though GHL's position on the 'seat of sensation' was characterized by James as an "argument from continuity" (1890, p. 138) his actual view was far more progressive. For Lewes, the recognition of identities such as: mind-body, sentience-consciousness, function-faculty, logic of feeling-logic of signs, etc. do not discredit their diversity of kind. Rather, "having established this entity and diversity we have solved the problem" (Lewes, 1877, p. 393).

The same inclusive logic was of recurring utility during the early years of North American psychology. James used it in his chapter on the self (i.e., his distinction and relation between the empirical, material, and social aspects). It is also found in Dewey's (1896) argument against the reflex arc concept (where the person's own activity constitutes the stimulus). Angell & Moore (1896) used it to overcome the false dichotomy between the positions of Baldwin and Titchener on reaction time research (i.e., differential performance of practiced vs. unpracticed subjects). Calkins (1905) used it in her APA address regarding the necessary relation between structure and function, and so forth.

The exclusion of Lewes from history texts is directly analogous to the widespread misunderstanding of C.L. Morgan's work. Morgan's "canon" (in fact concerned with differentiating lower from higher aspects of mentality) was widely misrepresented by behaviorists and subsequent experimental animal psychologists as a call for reductive negation of those higher aspects. While the historical rehabilitation of his canon is now underway (Costall, 1993; Wozniak, 1993), Morgan's later emergent evolutionist position is seldom mentioned in any depth.

The contemporaneous lack of disciplinary influence of their views can be attributed to the temporary dominance of hostile intellectual currents (respectively Absolute Idealism, and classical behaviorism). Similarly, their respective slip into mid-century obscurity can be attributed to the disciplinary failings of contemporary experimental psychology (and to those who wrote up its history). The reasons for the continuing historical neglect of these two figures, however, runs much deeper. It results from their routine use of a transformative form of logic which has not (as yet) been explicitly absorbed into the apperceptive mass of those who are currently attempting to write up the history of our discipline.

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