Extract From: Gergen, K. (1981). The meagre voice of empiricist affirmation. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 7, 333-337.

.... [p. 334]

The first third of the critique is then exhausted on the peripheral problem of the comparative impact of early European as opposed to contemporary American scholars. In my original arguments for generative theory [(Gergen, 1973, 1976, 1978a&b)], this issue was merely an introduction to ... more significant questions ...; in the present critique it has become a major site of battle. However, even with this inordinate attention given to a minor concern the outcome remains unclear. Of the major American theorists listed by the critics, virtually none has made his or her mark by collecting and analyzing data. Perhaps Leon Festinger is the only scholar in the group who has consistently employed data to demonstrate his arguments. And yet, it is ironic that this major figure is seldom cited for his empirical accomplishments.

This is not to argue that the range of seminal thinkers, both European and American, were unmindful of data. The critics are certainly correct in their description of Marx's concern with economic data, for example, and with characterizing those particular periods in which Durkheim and Weber lent their voices to empiricism. The central question in such cases is how the investigator views his or her relationship to what pass muster as "the facts." It is the empiricist view that it is "upon the facts that theory must be built, and against which theory must be tested" that one finds lacking within the influential works of both the early Europeans and Americans. There absence of concern over rigorous validation is surely not to be attributed to methodological ignorance. If "the facts" had been of critical importance, their professional lives might have been substantially altered. Rather, it appears that these theorists recognized the primacy of the significant idea. Ideas about social life are not driven by observation, nor can they be invalidated through observation: They essentially organize the process of observation itself. It is my fear and belief that in the contemporary fetish for rigorous method, the concern with revolutionary ideas has been woefully neglected. As argued, the neglect can be traced to a long-standing romance with empiricism.

Fact and Verification

The critics offer a variety of desultory doubts regarding my views of fact and verification. Most of these doubts can be laid to rest by bringing the argument back to center course. What is a social fact that it may be verified or falsified? Consider the human arm moving in an upward direction by 120 degrees at 22 miles per hour, pausing for 2.5 seconds and then returning to its resting place at 12 mph. Is this a social fact? To be sure, with proper measuring instruments we can verify that this public event did occur. Yet, is it a fact in which social psychologists are likely to take interest? Would we wish to develop theories of such movements, and to assess the various variables (such as wind velocity, time of day, size of arm, and so on) that might be systematically related to the direction and speed for the arm's movement? This form of social psychology is hardly imaginable; it is implausible both on theoretical and practical grounds. Observable movements of the arm, or of other features of the human body, are [p. 335] not in themselves of concern to the social psychologist. What transforms the observation into a social fact is its meaning, to the individual, to others, or to the theorist. Did the movement of the arm reflect the individual's attempt to salute, gain attention, beckon a friend, or insult an enemy? When we move to the level of the human meaning of the action, the social psychologist's interest is kindled. One can build theories concerning the giving of esteem through salutations, the search for attention, friendship, or aggression. Yet, the focus in such instances is on the attributed meaning of the action. Theories concerning such meaning cannot be derived from the behavior itself -the direction and speed of movement. Theories represent interpretations of the action's social meaning, and this meaning cannot itself be observed.

The result of this state of affairs should now be clear. The symbolic meaning of observables is, either on the level of mundane discourse or on the broad theoretical level, not open to objective verification or falsification. There is no observable referent to which the investigator can reliably point. The meaning of human action is dependent on the observer's system of interpretation. The observer must bring to the event a conceptual system through which behavioral observations may be rendered meaningful. There is no means of verifying or falsifying a "mode of interpretation." One may choose to agree or disagree because one employs a different system of interpretation, but one may not empirically falsify a theoretical competitor.

It is in this light that the substantive criticisms levied against generative theory drop away. Data and observation may be inimical to the development of theory because naive observation is already constrained by preexisting conceptual schemata. The problem for the theorist is not to observe more carefully or broadly. In doing so he or she can only serve to sustain existing forms of interpretation. Rather, the major task is that of developing alternative schemata for interpretation. To be sure, American social psychologists may have had some impact outside the field. However, because of their assumption of naive inductivism they have too frequently engaged in mere recapitulation of preexisting assumptions held by members of the culture. From this standpoint, data cannot be anomalous or theory-threatening unless, perhaps, the theorist possesses a rigid, inflexible, or conceptually barren framework of interpretation. In no sense can hypothesis testing rule between competing theories, and the proliferation of cross-cultural research cannot restore objectivity to the judgmental process. Nor am I arguing in any way that theorists forfeit their place within their culture. They must participate fully in order to gain those communication skills which enable them to make intelligent alternative views.

Social Psychology as an Honest Broker

The critics complete their attack by decrying the argument for valuational advocacy imbedded in the generative theory position. We now see that their chief argument, that valuational advocacy should give way to honest empirical assessment, is without fundamental merit....